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Abstract 
 
Introduction:  
Thought-action fusion refers to a belief that is associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD) in adults and children, but little experimental research has investigated the causal 
relationship between thought-action fusion and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. This study aims to 
investigate whether thought-action fusion causes obsessive-compulsive symptoms in children and 
whether this relationship is mediated by beliefs about responsibility.  
Method:  
Eighty-five children aged 9 to 11 years were randomly allocated to conditions in a between-subjects 
experimental design. They completed baseline measures of thought-action fusion, responsibility 
beliefs and anxiety. During phase 1 of the task, children wore a helmet and tried to make pictures on 
a computer turn red using their thoughts. Children in the experimental group saw the pictures turn 
red – to induce positive thought-action fusion beliefs - and those in the control group did not. In 
phase two of the task – designed to activate thought-action fusion concerns – children in both 
groups were told that the computer might be damaged by particular thoughts. Children could press a 
button if they were concerned their thoughts might damage the computer. Dependent variables 
were: induced thought-action fusion, anxiety, button-pressing, responsibility beliefs and thought-
control. 
Results: 
Children in the experimental group had significantly higher levels of induced thought-action fusion, 
indicating that the manipulation was successful. They also had higher levels of thought-control. 
Induced thought-action fusion was significantly correlated with thought-control in the experimental 
group. There were no other significant results. Results replicated some of the findings in the adult 
literature.  
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Conclusions: 
The results offer preliminary support for a causal link between thought-action fusion and thought-
control in children and add to the small body of literature suggesting that cognitive models of OCD 
may apply to children.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
 Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a serious anxiety disorder with a huge impact on 
the lives of those affected. Refining psychological models of OCD has important implications for 
the treatment of children. The aim of the research reported in this thesis is to improve understanding 
of the way psychological models of OCD apply to children. In particular, this study investigates 
whether thought-action fusion has a causal role in OCD symptoms in children. Thought-action 
fusion refers to beliefs about thoughts being equivalent to actions. These beliefs are associated with 
OCD in both children and adults but may not have a causal role. They are similar to „magical 
thinking‟, which is developmentally normal in younger children. There has been a growing interest 
in the link between thought-action fusion and OCD and how this may relate to normal development. 
In addition, there is disagreement over whether thought-action fusion contributes directly to 
symptoms of OCD or whether the relationship is mediated by other psychological factors. A small 
number of studies have investigated this question, but these have used mainly cross-sectional 
designs, making it difficult to determine the direction of relationships. Furthermore, most research 
has used adults. This research will use an experimental design to manipulate thought-action fusion 
in children and examine the effect of thought-action fusion on obsessive-compulsive (OC) 
behaviours. 
 This introduction begins by reviewing the clinical presentation of OCD in children. It will 
discuss theoretical approaches to OCD, in particular cognitive-behavioural models and their 
associated treatments. Research evaluating the role of thought-action fusion in OCD in adulthood 
will be discussed and the literature evaluating thought-action fusion in OCD in children will be 
critically discussed. It is proposed that thought-action fusion is an important OCD-related cognition 
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in adults and children. The chapter concludes with a summary and outlines the research hypotheses. 
 
1.2 The Clinical Presentation of OCD in Children 
 1.2.1 Diagnostic criteria. 
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) describes OCD as being characterised by recurrent 
obsessions and/or compulsions that cause marked distress and/or interference in functioning. 
Obsessions are defined as recurrent thoughts, images or impulses that are experienced as intrusive 
or inappropriate. Compulsions are repetitive behaviours or mental acts, which the person performs 
in response to an obsession or according to rigid rules. The aim of the compulsions is to reduce 
distress and/or prevent some dreaded event or situation. Common obsessions include thoughts about 
dirt and contamination, harmful events such as illness or death, symmetry and exactness, religious 
concern, unacceptable aggressive or sexual urges or ideas. Common compulsions, in response to 
these obsessions, include hand washing, checking, touching, ordering and mental compulsions such 
as counting, praying and cancelling thoughts. 
 OCD symptoms in children manifest themselves in a very similar way to those in adults, 
with the exception that children are not required to have insight into the unreasonable nature of the 
obsessions or compulsions in order to have a diagnosis. Usually children and adults report both 
obsessions and compulsions. Children usually present with a variety of different obsessions and 
compulsions which may well change over time (Hanna, 1995). 
 1.2.2 Epidemiology. 
 1.2.2.1 Prevalence.  
 Childhood OCD, as OCD in adulthood, is substantially more common than was once 
thought. Epidemiological studies in children (i.e. under 18 years) which have used mental health 
interviewers and semi-structured clinical interviews have found rates of 2.3%–4.0% (Douglass, 
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Moffitt, Dar, McGee, & Silva, 1995; Valleni-Basile et al., 1994; Zohar et al., 1992). A point 
prevalence estimate of a community sample of over 5000 14–18 year-olds in the United States of 
America suggested that at a given time, between 0.5% and 1% of children suffer from OCD. The 
same study reported a lifetime prevalence of 1.9% (Flament et al., 1988). Heyman et al. (2001) 
found an overall prevalence of 0.25% in a United Kingdom community sample of over 10000 5–15 
year-olds. They attributed their lower prevalence to their cut-off at age 15, compared with 18 years 
in other studies. Maina, Albert, Bogetto and Ravizza (1999) found the point prevalence of OCD in 
17 year-old males in Italy was 2% with a lifetime prevalence of 2.6%. They found sub-threshold 
levels of OC symptoms in 12.3% of their sample. Fireman, Koran, Leventhal and Jacobson (2001) 
found a 1-year prevalence of only 0.084% in a sample of over 1.7 million children and adults in the 
US. This study used outpatient diagnoses, which suggests that many cases of OCD may go 
unrecognised and untreated. Heyman et al. (2001) found that of the 25 children they identified with 
OCD, only three had been seen by specialist services. This could be partially due to secretiveness 
about symptoms; Whitaker et al. (1990) found that only 25% of young people with OCD were 
likely to seek treatment from a mental health professional. Lack of awareness of the condition and 
treatment availability may also contribute to many cases of childhood OCD remaining unnoticed 
and untreated. Jenike (1989, p539) characterised OCD as a “hidden epidemic”. 
 1.2.2.2 Age of onset, course and prognosis. 
 In children and adolescents, studies have reported a mean age of OCD onset of about 10 
years, but some children develop OCD when they are as young as 3 or 4 years (Garcia et al., 2009; 
Mancebo et al., 2008, Rasmussen, & Eisen, 1992). Researchers have observed that OCD has two 
peaks of incidence, one in childhood and a second in early adulthood at around 21–23 years 
(Mancebo et al., 2008; Pauls, Alsobrook, Goodman, Rasmussen, & Leckman, 1995). Over 50% of 
adults with OCD identify the onset of their symptoms before the age of 18 (Pauls et al., 1995) and 
approximately 40% of childhood-onset cases of OCD continue into adulthood, suggesting it can 
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take a chronic course (Stewart et al., 2004). A number of studies have shown that prevalence rises 
with age during childhood and adolescence (Heyman et al., 2001; Thomsen, 1993; Valleni-Basile et 
al., 1996; Zohar & Bruno, 1997). This suggests that developmental factors may increase the risk of 
OCD in childhood (Fontenelle & Hasler, 2008). 
 The onset of OCD is usually gradual. Hanna (1995) interviewed a small sample of children 
and adolescents with OCD and found that 55% had a gradual onset over a period of years, 
compared to only 6% who had an onset over a period of days. Garcia et al. (2009) investigated 
younger children aged 4–8 years old with OCD and found that 24% had an abrupt onset and 50% 
had a gradual onset, the remaining children were not able to identify how their symptoms began. 
However, in this study it is not clear how „abrupt‟ and „gradual‟ are defined.  
 The course of OCD can vary, one study of juveniles with OCD found that 70% reported a 
continuous course of OCD, while 28% reported that their OCD symptoms became significantly 
better at times (periods of at least 3 months' duration of sub-clinical symptoms) (Mancebo et al.,  
2008). Farrell and Barrett (2006) found that children and adolescents with OCD had less severe 
symptoms than adults with OCD and displayed significantly less insight, as might be expected 
developmentally.  
 OCD in childhood can be a devastating condition. Studies have found that it has detrimental 
effects on social, family and academic functioning (Leonard et al., 1993; Piacentini, Bergman, 
Keller, & McCracken, 2003; Geffken et al., 2006). Earlier onset of OCD seems to result in greater 
symptom severity in adulthood (Fontenelle, Mendlowicz, Marques, & Versiani, 2003) and more 
persistence of symptoms (Geller et al, 2001). This evidence suggests that childhood OCD is a 
debilitating condition in its own right with serious implications for future health and functioning. 
 1.2.3 Co-morbidity. 
 Rates of axis 1 co-morbidity are high for children and adolescents with OCD. Mancebo et al. 
(2008) found that 70% of children and 84% of adolescents with OCD had suffered from another 
5 
 
axis 1 disorder at some point, and that 50% of each met current criteria for another axis 1 disorder. 
Swedo, Rapoport, Leonard, Lenane and Cheslow (1989) found that 74% of children in their study 
had at least one other diagnosis; 35% had a co-morbid diagnosis of depression and 40% had another 
co-morbid anxiety disorder. De Mathis et al. (2008) interviewed 330 adults with OCD and found 
that the lower the age of onset, the higher the probability of a variety of co-morbidities, including 
anxiety disorders, eating disorders and impulse control disorders. Individuals with early onset OCD 
have higher rates of co-morbid tic disorders and Tourette's disorder (Miguel, Rosario-Campos, 
Shavitt, Hournie, & Marcadante, 2001; Millet et al., 2004). Leonard et al. (1992) found that nearly 
60% of children seeking treatment for OCD had a history of tics.  
 
1.3 Biological and Behavioural Approaches and Treatments for Childhood OCD 
 This section critically discusses the main biological and behavioural theories which explain 
how OCD is developed and maintained in children, with their associated treatment.  
 1.3.1 Biological models. 
 Family studies of adults and children with OCD suggest that there are genetic risk factors, 
particularly for childhood OCD. Several biological factors have been implicated in OCD, including 
neurochemistry and genetic factors which cause differences in the neuroanatomy of the brain.  
 Family studies have shown that the close relatives of people with OCD are more likely to 
have OCD themselves. A meta-analysis found that there was an 8.3% risk of OCD in first degree 
relatives of adults with the condition, compared to a 2% risk for the relatives of controls (Hettema, 
Neale, & Kendler, 2001). One large study of 106 children with OCD and 325 first-degree relatives, 
found a 22.7% rate of OCD in relatives, compared to a 0.9% rate in the relatives of controls 
(Rossario-Campos et al., 2005). A smaller study of 35 children with OCD and 102 first degree 
relatives found a very similar OCD rate of 22.5% in relatives, compared to 2.6% in relatives of 
controls (Hanna, Himle, Curtis, & Gillespie, 2005). It has also been pointed out that the greater 
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incidence of co-morbid tic disorders in childhood-onset OCD points to a possible genetic 
contribution (Alsobrook, Leckman, Goodman, Rasmussen, & Pauls, 1999). These results suggest 
that there may be a stronger genetic contribution to OCD that begins in childhood. However, family 
studies cannot show causality and it is difficult to separate the effect of a similar environment from 
similar genes. It is also the case that there are many children with OCD who have no relatives with 
OCD, so although genetics may be important, they are not a complete explanation. 
 Functional imaging studies of adults with OCD have found hyperactivity in the orbitofrontal 
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and caudate nucleus. One study has compared resting blood flow 
before and after treatment in children with OCD and used healthy controls as a comparison group 
(Castillo et al., 2005). The results were consistent with findings in adults, showing hyperactivity in 
the caudate and anterior cingulate, which declined after treatment. Findings such as these have been 
taken as evidence that there are abnormalities in cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops which 
are causally related to OCD, and which can be ameliorated by both pharmacological and 
behavioural treatments (Maia, Cooney, & Peterson, 2008; Baxter, Schwartz, Bergman, & Kenneth, 
1992).  
 1.3.2 Drug treatment. 
 Neurochemical factors, particularly serotonin, have also been proposed as mediators of 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are effective at 
reducing obsessive-compulsive symptoms in childhood OCD (Leonard, Ale, Freeman, Garcia, & 
Ng, 2005). The effect of medication is modest, with studies showing a 30%–40% decrease in OCD 
symptom severity (Geller et al, 2004; March & Curry, 1998). Furthermore, although side-effects of 
SSRI medication are well tolerated in children and adolescents (e.g. March & Curry, 1998) the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE; 2005) recommend that SSRIs should 
be used with caution in children as little is known about their effect on the immature brain. 
Research also suggests that symptom return is highly likely when medication is withdrawn (e.g., 
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Leonard et al., 1991). Given these difficulties with drug treatment for children with OCD, there has 
been growing emphasis on the importance of developing psychological treatments. 
 1.3.3. Behavioural model. 
 The principal behavioural model of OCD is based on Mowrer's (1960) two-stage theory of 
the acquisition of fear. Initially, a neutral stimulus (the conditioned stimulus), such as a dirty counter 
top, a particular activity or a thought image or impulse, is paired with an aversive stimulus. This 
pairing could happen because of a traumatic event or through a coincidence of arousal or attention. 
The conditioned stimulus then begins to evoke fear. Rachman (1977) proposed that anxiety can also 
develop through the transmission of information and modelling. 
 The second stage of Mowrer's (1960) model describes a process of operant conditioning 
where OCD is maintained by negative reinforcement of compulsions. When a compulsion is 
performed, anxiety levels reduce, so that the behaviour is negatively reinforced and more likely to 
be repeated. The compulsive responses and avoidance strategies developed by the child mean that 
they never have the opportunity to habituate to the intrusive thought, so their fear is not 
extinguished.  
 Some of the claims of this model have good empirical support. There is evidence in adults to 
show that operant conditioning contributes to the maintenance of OCD. Compulsive rituals lead to a 
short-term reduction in anxiety (Rachman, de Silva, & Roper, 1976) and exposure to obsessional 
stimuli provokes distress and the urge to perform a compulsion (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). 
However, the classical conditioning model of fear acquisition is not well supported in relation to the 
development of OCD. Traumatic events are rarely linked to the onset of OCD and when they are 
reported they often occur far in advance of the start of symptoms (Jones & Menzies, 1998). Also, as 
discussed above, the onset of OCD is often gradual, rather than a sudden response to a traumatic 
event. There is little evidence available to evaluate the alternative pathways to fear conditioning 
suggested by Rachman (1977). Furthermore, many children present with multiple obsessions and 
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the themes can shift over time, without any obvious conditioning experience. In summary, while the 
model effectively explains aspects of the maintenance of the condition, it struggles to fully explain 
its origins or complexities. 
 1.3.4 Exposure and response prevention (ERP). 
 ERP is based on a behavioural understanding of OCD and National Institute of Health and 
Clinical Excellence guidelines recommend that it should be part of the treatment offered to children 
with moderate to severe OCD (NICE; 2005). It involves exposing a child to a stimulus that would 
usually compel them to perform a compulsion – for example a dirty counter-top – and prolonging 
the exposure while the child refrains from performing their compulsion. In this way, they can 
experience that their anxiety begins to fall (habituation) and that nothing catastrophic happens. 
Exposure can take place with thoughts and images as well as with actual objects and situations. 
Treatment involves repeated and prolonged exposure to stimuli that trigger obsessional thoughts 
and anxiety. ERP with children also usually involves the parents, who are instructed in how to 
support their child to perform treatment exercises and resist performing compulsions. 
 Before the development of ERP in the 1960s, OCD was considered highly resistant to 
treatment. Early evaluations of ERP by Meyer (1966) showed that it led to sustained improvement 
in a large proportion of patients. In an open trial Bolton, Collins and Steinberg (1983) treated 15 
adolescents with OCD with ERP. Treatment was effective, with 87% of patients improving after 
treatment. The change in symptom severity from pre to post treatment had an effect size of 1.97. 
However, the participants were receiving hospital treatment, both as inpatients and outpatients 
because their OCD was so severe. As a result, all participants received other forms of therapy, 
including individual psychotherapy and family therapy, as well as the therapeutic milieu of the unit. 
Due to the lack of a control group and additional therapies, it is hard to tell how much of the change 
was due to the ERP. A recent meta-review (Rosa-Alcázar, Sánchez-Meca, Gómez-Conesa, & Marín-
Martínez, 2008) found ERP was an effective treatment of OCD in adults, with an overall effect size 
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of 1.127, based on 21 studies. Barrett, Farrell, Pina, Peris and Piacentini (2008) reviewed the 
literature on psychosocial treatments for child and adolescent OCD. They identified only one study 
which described ERP with children in the absence of any additional cognitive components to 
therapy. de Haan, Hoogduin, Buitelaar and Keisjers (1998) randomly assigned 22 children aged 8 to 
18 years to treatment with ERP or clomipramine. The ERP group had a 59.9% reduction in 
symptom severity, compared to a 33.4% reduction in the clomipramine group and this difference 
was significant (at p<0.05). However, a primary OCD diagnosis was established using an 
unspecified semi-structured interview and there was no follow-up to see if treatment gains were 
maintained.  
 Despite some evidence of its success, there remain a number of limitations to ERP alone for 
the treatment of OCD in children. The treatment can be very aversive and as many as a third of 
young people drop out because of the level of anxiety it can generate (Allsopp & Verduyn, 1990; 
Knox, Albano and Barlow, 1996). Bolton et al. (1983) had to physically restrain some adolescents 
to prevent them from performing rituals. Finally, not everyone shows a clinically significant 
decrease in OCD symptoms following ERP (Abramowitz, Whiteside and Deacon, 2005). It has also 
been suggested that when symptoms are mainly obsessional, response to ERP is more uncertain, 
because preventing people from performing mental compulsions is harder (Steketee, 1993). 
Piacentini and Langley (2004) point out that there could be particular developmental reasons why 
ERP may be unsuited to children. They argue that children are more present-oriented than adults, so 
less motivated to do difficult exercises for future gain. Children have also been shown to be less 
likely than adults to consider their symptoms excessive, which could also impair motivation for 
anxiety-provoking treatment. These limitations have encouraged researchers to develop other 
psychological treatments to enhance ERP.  
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1.4 Cognitive models 
 Cognitive methods of treatment have emerged to be used alongside ERP. These target 
distorted thoughts and beliefs which, it is proposed, contribute to the development and maintenance 
of OCD. The cognitive understanding of OCD is based on Beck's (1976) cognitive specificity 
model of emotion. According to this model, a situation itself does not cause emotions directly. 
Instead, it is the meanings that a person gives to a particular situation that causes their emotional 
reactions and subsequent behaviour. Particular interpretations are linked to particular emotional and 
behavioural reactions. Beck proposed that if an individual perceived a situation as dangerous and 
also believed that they would not be able to cope, this would result in intense anxiety. He 
hypothesised that past experiences cause people to develop particular beliefs about themselves, the 
world and others, which could cause them to interpret situations as more dangerous than they really 
are.  
 In OCD, the „situation‟ is an individual's intrusive thoughts. Research with adults shows that 
intrusive thoughts, images and impulses are normal and that their content differs little between 
clinical and non-clinical groups (Rachman, 1971; Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984). Allsopp and Williams (1996) found that 85% of a community sample of 
adolescents reported experiencing repetitive unwanted thoughts. Cognitive models suggest that 
intrusive thoughts can develop into obsessions if individuals have particular dysfunctional beliefs 
about them (e.g. Rachman, 2003; Salkovskis, 1999). The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group (OCCWG, 1997) identified a number of beliefs associated with OCD: (1) inflated 
responsibility; (2) thought-action fusion and beliefs concerning the over-importance of the 
consequences of one's thoughts; (3) excessive concern about the importance of controlling one's 
thoughts; (4) overestimation of the probability and severity of threat; and (5) intolerance of 
uncertainty. Some of these beliefs are associated with OCD in children and adolescents (Barrett & 
Healy, 2003; Libby, Reynolds, Derisley & Clark, 2004). Cognitive models suggest that these beliefs 
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about the meaning of intrusive thoughts trigger anxiety and attempts to control the thoughts. In turn, 
intrusive thoughts escalate, becoming persistent and distressing obsessions.  
 1.4.1 Thought-action fusion. 
 Thought-action fusion is one of the beliefs identified by the OCCWG (1997) as linked to 
OCD in adults. Thought-action fusion is a cognitive distortion which describes beliefs about the 
equivalence of thoughts and actions. Although thought-action fusion can be positive (for example, a 
belief that thinking about winning the lottery makes it more likely to happen) negative thought-
action fusion has been more closely considered in relation to OCD. Moral thought-action fusion is 
the belief that to think about doing a terrible thing is as morally wrong as actually doing it. For 
example, a mother may believe that it is as bad to think about pushing her child onto a railway track 
as to actually do it. Likelihood thought-action fusion is the belief that thinking about a negative 
action makes it more likely to come about. Likelihood thought-action fusion can be further broken 
down into two different domains: likelihood-self and likelihood-other beliefs. Likelihood-self refers 
to the belief that thoughts could harm the self; for example thinking about yourself being in an 
accident would make it more likely to happen. Likelihood-other refers to the belief that thoughts 
can harm other people; for example thinking about a family member becoming sick would make it 
more likely to happen. Although likelihood and moral thought-action fusion are distinct concepts, 
they may be related. Rachman and Shafran (1999) point out that if an individual believes that their 
thoughts have made a bad consequence more likely, they may also consider it morally wrong to 
have such thoughts. 
 1.4.2 Developmental influences on thought-action fusion. 
 Thought-action fusion has been linked with the broader concept of magical thinking. This 
has been defined as “the type of thinking that embraces the possibility that magical and other types 
of mental-physical causality can directly affect perceived or imagined objects” (Subbotsky, 2005, p. 
301). There may be a number of developmental issues which could influence magical thinking and 
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thought-action fusion beliefs in children. Young children are trying to establish what can happen in 
the world and the extent of their own power, and they do not yet have a clear understanding of 
normal causal principles (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998). Noting that one event precedes another is a 
way in which adults, but particularly children, decide causality (Phelps and Woolley, 1994). This 
can lead to a young child over-estimating their control over events. In this way, a thought might be 
seen to precede an action or an event and causal power attributed to it. Tallis (1994) suggested that 
thought-action fusion beliefs important to the maintenance of OCD could develop after a chance 
pairing of a thought and a negative event. Shafran and Rachman (1996) described a patient whose 
father died after she wished him dead. She came to believe that she had caused his death and 
developed strong likelihood and moral thought-action fusion beliefs. 
 A further developmental influence on thought-action fusion beliefs may come in later 
childhood. According to Piaget (1973), the formal operational period starts from age 11 and is 
characterised by abstract reasoning and the ability to reflect on one's own thinking. Having 
„thoughts about thoughts‟ is an important component of cognitive theories of OCD. Geller et al. 
(1998) found that the first peak in onset of OCD was between 10 and 12 years. This suggests that 
children of this age, perhaps because of cognitive development, could be particularly vulnerable to 
OCD. If children become more aware of their own thoughts, it is possible that thought-action fusion 
beliefs could be more likely to have a pernicious effect.  
 In normally developing children, magical thinking is common in younger children and 
decreases with age (Subbotsky, 2005; Woolley, 1997; Woolley, Phelps, Davis, & Mandell, 1999). In 
an unpublished study, Laing, Fernyhough and Freeston (2007) found that thought-action fusion was 
highest in children aged around 7–10, before dropping off in early adolescence. A number of 
authors have suggested that magical thinking may give the appearance of control when real control 
is not possible (Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-Luque, & Baron-Cohen, 2002; Einstein, & Menzies, 
2004). In this way, magical thinking could seem to be a way of coping with anxiety (Bolton, 1996). 
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Thought-action fusion along with other magical thinking beliefs may be a relatively normal part of 
childhood, which would usually decrease naturally with age. Since thought-action fusion is an 
OCD-related belief which seems likely to have a developmental component, it is of particular 
interest in relation to childhood OCD.    
  1.4.3 Thought-action fusion in psychological models of OCD. 
 The role of thought-action fusion beliefs in three main models of OCD is described below. 
 1.4.3.1 Rachman's misinterpretation of significance model. 
 Rachman (1997, 1998, 2003) proposed that OCD is more likely to develop if an individual 
considers an intrusive thought to be personally significant and threatening. Likelihood thought-
action fusion beliefs can cause fears about being a danger to others or one's self, while moral 
thought-action fusion beliefs could lead an individual to think they were „bad‟ for having a 
particular thought. As a result, thought-action fusion beliefs in response to particular thoughts could 
contribute to a catastrophic misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts as meaning that an individual is 
„mad, bad or dangerous‟. This leads to an increase in anxiety, guilt and attempts to limit thoughts or 
their harmful consequences. These attempts could be mental, with thought-control strategies such as 
suppression and neutralisation, or physical, with compulsive behaviours or rituals designed to 
reduce danger. In the longer term, avoidance behaviours might also develop. An individual who 
believes that particular people are put in danger by their thoughts might avoid those people, or 
avoid situations which trigger the thoughts. In the short term, avoidance and mental and physical 
compulsions would decrease anxiety and so be reinforced. In the longer term, however, these would 
prevent dis-confirmation of the thought-action fusion beliefs; for example an individual might 
think: „If I had not performed my ritual, something bad would have happened‟. Anxiety and mental 
and physical control strategies also increase the salience of the intrusive thoughts, making them 
more frequent. Rachman (1997) suggests that, as well as contributing directly to symptoms of OCD 
in the way described above, thought-action fusion may contribute to, and be a product of, other 
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cognitive biases involved in OCD. 
 1.4.3.2 Salkovskis' inflated responsibility model. 
 Inflated responsibility is defined as “The belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring 
about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes. These outcomes are perceived as essential 
to prevent.” (Salkovskis, 1996, p.110). According to Salkovskis, a responsibility appraisal would 
increase an individual's motivation to prevent harm in order to discharge their duty of responsibility. 
Salkovskis (1985) considered thought-action fusion as a kind of responsibility appraisal. He argued 
that in OCD intrusive thoughts often lead to concerns about being responsible for harm. Thought-
action fusion beliefs would be likely to increase responsibility appraisals. If a person believes their 
thoughts could cause harm, they are more likely to feel responsible for preventing harm (Shafran, 
Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996). According to this model, thought-action fusion would be 
associated with OCD by triggering appraisals of responsibility for harm. In turn, these would trigger 
the anxiety and cognitive and behavioural strategies which would lead to the development of 
obsessions and compulsions. 
 1.4.3.3 Wells' metacognitive model.  
 The metacognitive beliefs model of OCD (Wells, 1997, 2000; Wells & Matthews, 1994) 
emphasises meta-cognitive beliefs about the meaning or consequences of having particular intrusive 
thoughts. They emphasise two different belief domains: (1) beliefs about the importance/meaning 
and power of thoughts, and (2) beliefs about the need to control thoughts and/or perform rituals. 
The first domain includes thought-action fusion beliefs. The metacognitive model considers 
thought-action fusion to be a metacognitive belief about thoughts, so, like Rachman's model (2003), 
predicts that thought-action fusion beliefs should directly contribute to obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. However, according to this model, a number of other meta-cognitive beliefs about the 
importance of controlling thoughts also contribute, so thought-action fusion beliefs would not be 
necessary or sufficient to lead to obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  
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1.5 Cognitive Therapy for OCD 
 1.5.1 Cognitive therapy with adults. 
 As cognitive theories have developed, cognitive therapy has increasingly been used 
alongside ERP to treat OCD. In their meta-analysis, Abramowitz, Franklin and Foa (2002), found 
effect sizes of 1.50, 1.19 and 0.99 for ERP, cognitive therapy and the combination, respectively. 
Rosa-Alcázar et al. (2008) carried out a meta-analysis of psychological treatments for obsessive-
compulsive disorder in adults. Overall treatment versus control effect sizes of 1.127, 1.090 and 
0.998 were found for ERP, cognitive therapy alone and ERP plus cognitive therapy for OCD. Rosa-
Alcázar et al. concluded that cognitive therapy and ERP were equally effective in the treatment of 
OCD and that the combination did not seem to produce an improvement in effectiveness. Eddy, 
Dutra, Bradley and Westen (2004) included studies without control groups in their meta-analysis. 
They compared pre- and post-treatment results and found effect sizes of 1.53, 1.45 and 1.39 for 
ERP, cognitive therapy and CBT respectively.  
 None of these effect sizes are based on intention-to-treat analyses, and as there were large 
drop-out rates in some studies this is problematic. For example, Vogel, Stiles and Götestam (2004), 
compared ERP with cognitive therapy to ERP with relaxation training. Seven out of 19 patients 
dropped out of the ERP with relaxation condition, compared to 1 out of 16 for the ERP plus 
cognitive therapy condition. Including only the data from those who completed treatment resulted in 
a larger effect size for ERP with relaxation that is unlikely to represent the success of the treatment 
and obscures differences between treatments. Eddy et al. (2004) point out that strict exclusion 
criteria were used in many studies, resulting in exclusion rates of approximately 50% in the few 
studies which reported them. They argue that while some exclusion criteria are appropriate, others, 
such as co-morbidity, may not be. Numerous exclusion criteria may also make it difficult to tell 
whether cognitive therapy and ERP are effective with different patient groups. Whittal, Thordarson 
and McLean (2005) argued that early cognitive therapy trials were not designed to specifically 
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target the dysfunctional appraisals identified by the OCCWG (1997), which may make these less 
effective. Despite these difficulties, these meta-analyses suggest that cognitive therapy as well as 
ERP and CBT can be an effective treatment for OCD.  
 1.5.2 Cognitive therapy with children. 
 Since cognitive distortions also seem to have a role in childhood OCD, some form of 
cognitive intervention has become standard in the treatment of childhood OCD (NICE, 2005; 
Brown et al., 2007). March, Mulle and Herbel (1994) developed a manualised CBT treatment for 
children with OCD. This helps children to re-label their fears, giving „OCD‟ a nasty nickname, so 
they are better able to distance themselves from their anxious thoughts and „boss back‟ OCD. 
Cognitive components also involve psycho-education, cognitive restructuring of anxious thoughts, 
with the help of age-appropriate metaphors, and helping children to more accurately evaluate the 
likelihood of feared consequences. In the context of cognitive components, ERP is often used to test 
anxious predictions, rather than as a purely behavioural component. Many subsequently developed 
treatments for childhood OCD have used components from this manual (e.g. Barrett, Healy-Farrell 
and March, 2004). 
 Barrett et al. (2008) reviewed evidence-based psychosocial treatments for OCD in children 
and adolescents. Two of the reviewed studies were rigorous randomised controlled trials (RCTs). 
Barrett et al. (2004) compared individual (I)CBT and group (G)CBT with a wait-list control 
condition. Both had a family component and both led to a significant symptom reduction of over 
60%, with an effect size (compared to wait-list) of 2.84 for the ICBT and 2.63 for the GCBT. 
Treatment outcomes were maintained to 18-month follow-up (Barrett, Farrell, Dadds, & Boulter, 
2005). The inclusion of a family-intervention component of both CBT groups makes it hard to 
assess how much of the success was due to CBT and how much to more effective parental 
responses to symptoms. Furthermore, for ethical reasons, the wait-list control group was limited to 
4–6 weeks, so that it was not possible to compare the three conditions over the same time period.  
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 The Pediatric OCD Treatment Study (POTS; 2004) compared CBT with and without SSRI, 
SSRI alone and a drug placebo. A significant advantage was found for the two CBT conditions with 
response rates of 53.6% for combination treatment, 39.0% for CBT alone, 21% for SSRI alone and 
3% for drug placebo. The effect sizes for the CBT and combined groups, compared to the placebo 
group, were 0.99 and 1.46 respectively. Barrett et al. (2008) concluded that the most thoroughly 
examined psychological intervention for OCD in children and adolescents is CBT and that it met 
the requirements for “a probably efficacious” intervention. 
 
1.6 The Role of Thought-Action Fusion in OCD in Adults 
  1.6.1 Evidence for an association between thought-action fusion and OCD. 
 A number of studies have found an association between OCD and thought-action fusion. 
Berle and Starcevic (2005) and Shafran and Rachman (2004) noted small to large correlations of 
between 0.2 and 0.38 between thought-action fusion and OC symptoms in non-clinical participants. 
Larger correlations of up to 0.58 have been found in clinical samples (Rassin, Diepstraten, 
Merckelbach, & Muris, 2001). They also found that the correlation between likelihood thought-
action fusion and OCD symptoms is stronger than that for moral thought-action fusion in non-
clinical and clinical samples. Questionnaire studies have also shown that thought-action fusion is 
higher in clinical participants and that clinical groups score more highly on likelihood-other 
thought-action fusion (Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Schmidt, 2001; Shafran et al., 1996). Shafran 
and Rachman (2004) concluded that there was an association between obsessional psychopathology 
and likelihood thought-action fusion but that moral thought-action fusion did not seem to be 
significantly and reliably related to obsessional complaints in non-clinical samples. 
 Two questionnaire-based studies have looked at how the relationship between thought-action 
fusion and obsessive-compulsive symptoms might be affected by other OCD-related beliefs. 
Gwilliam, Wells and Cartwright-Hatton (2004) compared the meta-cognitive and inflated 
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responsibility models of OCD in a non-clinical sample. When responsibility was controlled, 
thought-action fusion was still correlated with obsessive-compulsive symptoms. When meta-
cognitive variables including thought-action fusion were controlled, responsibility was no longer 
significantly correlated with symptoms. The authors argued that this supports the hypothesis that 
inflated responsibility is a by-product of meta-cognitions and makes little additional contribution to 
OCD. Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary and Brigidi (2003) compared participants with OCD to a 
non-clinical group and found that after controlling for ratings of responsibility, the OCD group still 
had significantly higher likelihood thought-action fusion. When controlling for likelihood thought-
action fusion, responsibility no longer differed. However, both these studies were observational and 
Maxwell and Cole (2007) have pointed out that using statistical models based on cross-sectional 
data to demonstrate the direction of causal effects can be misleading. 
 1.6.2 Evidence for a causal role for thought-action fusion in OCD. 
 In order to demonstrate a causal role for thought-action fusion in OCD, longitudinal or 
experimental studies are necessary (Field, 2005). Shafran and Rachman (2004) identified 6 
experimental studies and one longitudinal study and a search of the literature since this review 
identified one further longitudinal study and two further experimental studies. Most of these 
experimental studies have used a sentence paradigm to induce thought-action fusion. Participants 
were asked to write out and then visualise a sentence designed to induce thought-action fusion 
concerns, for example: “I hope X is in a car accident”, imagining a close friend or relative for X. A 
number of studies have used this sentence paradigm in non-clinical groups and found an increase in 
anxiety, suppression and spontaneous neutralising behaviour (Bocci & Gordon, 2007, Rassin, 2001; 
Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman, 1996; van den Hout, Kindt, Weiland, & Peters, 
2002; van den Hout, van Pol, & Peters, 2001; Zucker, Craske, Barrios, & Holguin, 2002). Two 
studies found that neutralising was positively correlated with likelihood thought-action fusion 
(Bocci and Gordon, 2007; van den Hout et al., 2002). Rachman et al. (1996) used a high thought-
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action fusion sample and found that likelihood-other thought-action fusion was also correlated with 
anxiety, responsibility and probability of harm. 
 One longitudinal study with non-clinical participants (Abramowitz, Nelson, Rygwall, & 
Khandker, 2007) measured thought-action beliefs in couples in the last trimester of pregnancy. They 
found that likelihood-other thought-action fusion beliefs predicted postpartum obsessive-
compulsive symptom development.  
 Two experimental studies examined the effect of an intervention designed to reduce thought-
action fusion. Zucker et al. (2002) found that a group who received an educational message about 
thought-action fusion were less anxious after writing a sentence designed to induce thought-action 
fusion than a group who received a placebo message. Zucker, Craske, Blackmore and Nitz (2006) 
ran a three hour cognitive-behavioural workshop for individuals with sub-clinical OC symptoms. 
This included psycho-education on thought-action fusion and its role in OCD, together with a group 
exercise to challenge thinking errors including thought-action fusion. This resulted in lower 
thought-action fusion beliefs compared to a wait-list control group at one and five month follow-ups 
and fewer intrusive thoughts and compulsive habits at the five month follow-up. These studies 
suggest that further research would be valuable to establish whether cognitive interventions 
designed to target thought-action fusion may be helpful in the treatment of OCD. 
  All these studies have used non-clinical participants. This is appropriate to examine possible 
causal relationships. In clinical samples, causal relationships cannot be examined and these samples 
are more appropriate to test maintenance of OCD symptoms. The sentence paradigm used in the 
experimental studies may not be a very ecologically valid representation of thought-action fusion. 
Writing down a thought may increase confidence in the thought (Briñol & Petty, 2003) and thinking 
about a loved one in a car accident could induce anxiety because it is an aversive activity, as well as 
for reasons of thought-action fusion. Despite these limitations, the evidence from these studies 
offers some support for a causal link between thought-action fusion and OCD, but further research 
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is needed.  
1.6.3 Summary: The role of thought-action fusion in OCD. 
 Three central models of OCD all describe a relationship between thought-action fusion and 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Rachman's (2003) personal significance model and the meta-
cognitive model (Wells & Matthew, 1994) both argue that thought-action fusion beliefs are likely to 
contribute directly to the development and maintenance of OCD. In contrast, Salkovskis' (1985) 
Inflated Responsibility Model sees responsibility beliefs as mediating the relationship between 
thought-action fusion beliefs and OCD.  
 Cross-sectional questionnaire studies as well as experimental and longitudinal studies lend 
support to a causal role for thought-action fusion in OCD. Thought-action fusion, as an aspect of 
magical thinking, appears to be a common belief in childhood which, in normal development, 
reduces with age. It is plausible that, for this reason, it may be particularly important to understand 
its role in OCD in children. The next section evaluates research into the role of thought-action 
fusion in OCD in children. 
 
1.7 The Role of Thought-Action Fusion Beliefs in OCD in Children 
A small number of studies have examined whether thought-action fusion beliefs are also related to 
OCD in childhood. This section critically evaluates this research. It begins by describing the 
literature search strategy used. The studies are then reviewed according to the type of sample 
(clinical or non-clinical) and type of design. 
 1.7.1 Literature search strategy. 
Computerised searches were done on Psychinfo (1806 to date), Medline (1996 to date) and Embase 
(1980 to date). The search terms were: (OCD OR obsessive OR compulsive) and (Child OR 
Children OR adolescent OR young people OR juvenile) AND (cognitive model* OR cognitive 
appraisal OR cognitive processes OR meta-cognition OR thought-action fusion OR magical 
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thinking). Hand searches were also conducted on: Behaviour Research and Therapy (1998–2010) 
and The Journal of Anxiety Disorders (1998–2010). Hand searches were conducted from 1998 
onwards because few articles on thought-action fusion were published before this time. 
 Following this search, papers were selected based on a number of criteria. Articles were 
included if they offered data about the relationship between thought-action fusion and OCD in 
children or adolescents aged 18 years or under. Where studies had used both adolescents and adults 
in a single group, the average age of participants had to be 18 years or under. Articles had to be 
written in English.  
 The search identified 10 studies which met inclusion criteria (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Current Research Examining the Role of Thought-Action Fusion in OCD in Children 
Clinical 
Experimental Age Range Observational Age range  
    
  Barrett and Healy (2003) 7–13  
  Farrell and Barrett (2006) 6–11, 12–17 
  Libby, Reynolds, Derisley and 
Clark (2004) 
11–18 
 
  Verhaak and de Haan (2007) 8–12, 13–
18 
 
Non-Clinical 
Rassin, Merckelbach, 
Muris and Spaan 
(1999) 
16–20 Evans, Milanak, Medeiros and 
Ross (2002) 
3–8  
  Simonds, Demetre and Read 
(2009) 
5–10 
  Matthews, Reynolds and 
Derisley (2007) 
13–16 
  Muris, Meesters, Rassin, 
Merckelbach and Campbell 
(2001) 
13–16 
  Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-
Luque and Baron-Cohen (2002) 
5–17 
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 1.7.2 Studies of thought-action fusion and OCD in children. 
 1.7.2.1 Studies with non-clinical samples. 
 1.7.2.1.1 Observational studies. 
 Muris, Meesters, Rassin, Merckelbach and Campbell (2001) found that thought-action 
fusion was significantly associated with symptoms of OCD (r=0.34) in a sample of 427 13-16 year 
olds. They also found significant associations with trait anxiety (r=0.31) panic and agoraphobia 
symptoms (r=0.27), generalised anxiety disorder (r=0.31), separation anxiety (r=0.24), social 
phobia symptoms (r=0.27) and depression symptoms (r=0.33). When they controlled for trait 
anxiety, only symptoms of OCD, generalised anxiety and depression remained significantly related 
to thought-action fusion. The authors did not check to see whether thought-action fusion was still 
related to anxiety and depression once obsessional symptoms had been controlled for. They 
concluded that this supported the proposal that thought-action fusion is involved in a range of 
anxiety disorders but that it is most relevant for OCD.  
 One study investigated whether thought-action fusion or inflated responsibility is a better 
predictor of OC symptoms in a non-clinical sample. Matthews, Reynolds and Derisley (2007) found 
that thought-action fusion (r=0.35) and inflated responsibility (r=0.56) were significantly 
correlated with OC symptoms in a sample of 223 adolescents aged 13–16 years. When inflated 
responsibility was controlled the relationship between thought-action fusion and OC symptoms was 
fully mediated by responsibility attitudes.  
 Three studies investigated the relationship between magical thinking and OC symptoms in 
non-clinical samples. Evans, Milanak, Medeiros and Ross (2002) found that rituals and 
compulsions were positively related to beliefs about the effects of wishing (r=0.40) in 31 3–8 year 
old children. Bolton et al. (2002) found a relationship between magical thinking and obsessive-
compulsive symptoms (r=0.42) in 127 children aged 5–17. Simonds, Demetre and Read (2009) 
found that magical thinking was significantly correlated with OC symptoms (r=0.374) in a sample 
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of 102 5–10 year-olds. They also found that this correlation was significantly higher in the youngest 
age group. 
 One difficulty with these studies is that participants were not experiencing problems with 
OCD symptoms, so results may not generalise to a clinical population. They are also all cross-
sectional so cannot demonstrate causality. Matthews et al. (2007) used cross-sectional data to 
demonstrate a mediating relationship, but cross-sectional approaches to mediation can be 
problematic (Maxwell & Cole, 2007). Three studies (Bolton et al., 2002; Evans et al., 2002; 
Simonds et al., 2009) used measures of magical thinking rather than thought-action fusion. These 
measures included items which linked thoughts to events and actions just as in likelihood-thought-
action fusion. However, these items were not restricted to negative events, as they are in the 
thought-action fusion scale and there were a large number of other non-thought-action fusion items 
included in the magical thinking scales. 
 1.7.2.1.2 Experimental studies. 
 One experimental study investigated thought-action fusion in a mixed sample of adults and 
adolescents (mean age = 17.1 years). Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, and Spaan (1999), told 
participants in the experimental group that apparatus could pick up the word „apple‟ in their 
thoughts and that thoughts of that word would result in an electric shock being given to someone 
else. The control group were simply told that the apparatus could pick up their thoughts and they 
could think of anything, including the word „apple‟. Those in the experimental group experienced 
more discomfort, and more intrusions of the word „apple‟. They showed neutralisation behaviour 
(subjects could press a button if they thought „apple‟ to prevent a shock) in about 50% of intrusions. 
However, there was no correlation between previously measured thought-action fusion beliefs and 
any of these outcomes. The presence of higher thought-action fusion in the experimental group was 
assumed to exist because students were told that their thoughts had real-world consequences. 
Participants' level of belief in the instruction was not measured. In this experimental paradigm it is 
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also possible that responsibility played a significant role, and may have interacted with thought-
action fusion beliefs. While this study offers support for a link between thought-action fusion and 
OCD-related symptoms, the mechanism of this link remains uncertain. Furthermore, this study 
included adult participants, which limits its relevance for the purposes of this review. 
 1.7.2.2 Studies with clinical samples.  
 Four studies have used clinical samples assessed using criteria based on the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (fourth edition; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). Three used the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for Children and Parents 
(ADIS-C and ADIS-P; Silverman & Albano, 1996) which apply DSM-IV criteria and are 
considered to be a gold standard in childhood anxiety diagnosis and one (Verhaak & de Haan, 2007) 
used an unstructured assessment with a clinical psychologist, followed by a discussion by a multi-
disciplinary mental health team to determine diagnostic status. As a result, the diagnostic status of 
children in this study may be less certain. 
 Barrett and Healy (2003) compared a number of appraisals associated with OCD in children 
with OCD, anxious children and a non-clinical control group. They found that OCD children scored 
significantly more highly on thought-action fusion than the non-clinical control group. However, 
thought-action fusion did not distinguish between the OCD group and the anxious group. The OCD 
group had higher ratings of thought-action fusion than the anxious group, but the difference was not 
significant. This may have been because a relatively small sample size was used (N=59) so there 
was not enough power to detect a difference. It may also have been because anxious participants 
had some obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  
 Farrell and Barrett (2006) also investigated OCD-related appraisals in 34 children, 39 
adolescents and 38 adults with OCD. They found no significant difference between the age groups 
for thought-action fusion beliefs, although they did for other OCD-related appraisals. Across the 
entire sample, they found that likelihood-self (r=0.27) and likelihood-other (r=0.30) thought-action 
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fusion was significantly associated with symptom severity. They concluded that thought-action 
fusion was likely to be associated with OCD in childhood to a similar degree as it is in adolescence 
or adulthood. However, although they showed a link between thought-action fusion and symptom 
severity, the authors did not assess whether the association remained the same across the groups.  
 Libby et al. (2004) measured likelihood-other thought-action fusion beliefs in children aged 
11–18 years, with OCD (N=28), other anxiety disorders (N=28) and non-clinical controls (N=28). 
The OCD group had significantly higher scores on likelihood-other thought-action fusion than 
either of the other two groups and the anxiety group had significantly higher scores than the non-
clinical group. Across all groups, thought-action fusion showed a large association with OCD 
symptom severity (r=0.51) and the average likelihood-other thought-action fusion score in the OCD 
group (M = 7.82) was actually higher than that observed in studies with adults who have OCD (e.g. 
Rassin, Merckelbach, et al., 2001, M = 4.43; Shafran et al., 1996, M = 4.77). Libby et al. concluded 
that likelihood-other thought-action fusion had a minor role in anxiety disorders in young people 
and a specific association with OCD. 
 Veerhaak and de Haan (2007) measured magical thinking in 18 children aged 8-12 and 21 
adolescents aged 13–18 with OCD. They found no association between magical thinking and 
symptom severity. The authors concluded that thought-action fusion seemed to have no connection 
with the severity of OCD symptoms in children and adolescents. However, this study did not use a 
measure of thought-action fusion. The Magical Thinking Questionnaire (MTQ; Bolton et al., 2002) 
contains 10 items out of 30 which assess the perceived power of thoughts. Of these, only four 
describe a link between a thought and a negative event. The broad nature of this measure could 
account for the lack of association found. It may also be that the sample size was too small to 
provide adequate power. Given these difficulties, their conclusion seems inadequately supported. 
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 1.7.3 Summary of the literature examining whether thought-action fusion is associated 
with OCD in children. 
 The research suggests that thought-action fusion is associated with OCD in children and 
adolescents. Only Verhaak and de Haan (2007) reported contrary results. This study measured 
magical thinking, rather than thought-action fusion, and did not use a standard diagnostic measure, 
making the conclusion questionable. There is limited research comparing alternative models of 
thought-action fusion and its role in OCD. Only Matthews et al. (2007) tested the mediating 
relationship of inflated responsibility beliefs and thought-action fusion. They found that inflated 
responsibility did mediate the relationship between thought-action fusion and OC symptoms. 
 Although the evidence suggests that thought-action fusion is a relevant belief in childhood 
OCD, there are a number of limitations to the research evidence. All the studies apart from Rassin et 
al. (1999) used cross-sectional questionnaire based designs. These can show association but not 
causality. Rassin et al. designed an experiment which offered some support for a causal role of 
thought-action fusion in the development of OCD. However, there were difficulties with the design 
and the participant group included adults, so the results may not generalise to younger adolescents 
or children. Further research using an experimental design in a younger age group would help to 
investigate the possibility of a causal role for thought-action fusion in OCD. 
 1.7.4 The influence of cognitive development on thought-action fusion. 
 Of the studies reviewed, five measured magical thinking or thought-action fusion beliefs in a 
non-clinical group and of these, three found a decrease with age (Matthews et al., 2007, Libby et al., 
2004; Simonds et al., 2009). In Simonds et al. (2009) the decrease was not significant. Libby et al. 
(2004) found that children aged 11–18 in their non-clinical group had higher thought-action fusion 
scores than adults in a general non-clinical population. Evans et al. (2002) did not find a significant 
correlation between magical thinking score and age. This may have been because younger children, 
aged 3–8 took part in this study and magical thinking is high across this age group. Bolton et al. 
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(2002) did not find a significant decrease in magical thinking, but did find that 9–10 year olds had 
the highest level of magical thinking, significantly higher than 12–13 year olds. This is consistent 
with an unpublished study by Laing et al. (2007) which found that thought-action fusion beliefs 
peaked at 7–10 years before decreasing in early adolescence. 
 Farrell and Barrett (2006) found no significant difference in thought-action fusion beliefs 
between clinical groups of children, adolescents and adults. In contrast, Libby et al. (2004) found 
that the thought-action fusion likelihood-other scores of the children with OCD in their sample were 
greater than those in adults with OCD.  
 This evidence suggests that thought-action fusion may decrease in normally developing 
children, although results for magical thinking are more mixed. In comparison, thought-action 
fusion remains higher in children and adolescents with OCD and it is uncertain whether it decreases 
with age. 
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter has examined the current understanding of OCD in children. There are many 
similarities between OCD in children and in adults. Treatment for OCD in childhood is primarily 
based on ERP but this has a number of practical limitations, often resulting in a high drop-out rate. 
In adults, cognitive methods are increasingly used alongside ERP. One belief that has been shown to 
be associated with OCD in adults is thought-action fusion. The role of thought-action fusion in three 
main cognitive models of OCD has been discussed. The role of thought-action fusion in OCD in 
children has been reviewed and it appears that thought-action fusion is associated with OCD in 
children, although the nature of this association remains somewhat unclear. The developmental 
literature regarding thought-action fusion and magical thinking in children is discussed. It suggests 
that thought-action fusion beliefs may be quite normal in younger children and usually decrease 
after middle childhood. In children with OCD, thought-action fusion beliefs appear to remain high. 
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 1.8.1 Rationale for study. 
 The literature suggests that thought-action fusion is an important OCD-related appraisal in 
children but different models suggest that thought-action fusion may contribute directly to 
symptoms (Rachman, 2003; Wells and Matthews, 1994) or that it is mediated by other factors 
(Salkovskis, 1985). If thought-action fusion is directly linked with OCD symptoms then cognitive 
methods, similar to those used in adult populations, for challenging thought-action fusion beliefs 
might prove helpful in childhood OCD. If it is indirectly linked, then methods targeting other more 
primary beliefs might be more useful. To demonstrate a causal link between thought-action fusion 
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, experimental research is needed. 
 This study seeks to test, experimentally, whether thought-action fusion is causally related to 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms in a non-clinical group of children and whether this link is 
mediated by responsibility beliefs. It will use an experimental method, based loosely on that of 
Rassin et al. (1999) to induce a thought-action fusion belief. Children in the experimental group will 
be led to believe they can influence pictures on a computer screen with their thoughts. It will then 
be suggested that some thoughts might damage the computer. As in Rassin et al., the children will 
have a button they can press if they have a thought they are concerned about. Button-pressing, 
anxiety, thought-control and experimentally-induced responsibility and thought-action fusion will 
be measured. This study will differ from that of Rassin et al. by providing what is designed to be a 
more ecologically valid method of inducing thought-action fusion in a younger age group. 
 
1.9 Research Hypotheses 
 1.9.1 Question 1: Does thought-action fusion cause OCD behaviours? 
 Hypothesis 1: Manipulation check. Children in the thought-action fusion group will show 
higher levels of experimentally induced thought-action fusion than children in the control 
group. 
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 Hypothesis 2: Children in the experimental group will show more button-pressing, 
experimentally-induced responsibility anxiety and thought-control. 
 Hypothesis 3: Induced thought-action fusion will be positively correlated with the dependent 
variables.  
 Hypothesis 4: Children's initial level of likelihood thought-action fusion beliefs will 
contribute significantly to the variance of the outcome measures. 
 1.9.2 Question 2: What is the role of responsibility in the relationship between thought-
action fusion and OCD behaviours? 
 Hypothesis 5: Children who have stronger responsibility beliefs will score more highly on 
the dependent variables for a given level of thought-action fusion. Therefore, the 
relationship between experimentally-induced thought-action fusion and the dependent 
variables of button-pressing, anxiety and thought-control will be moderated by 
responsibility beliefs.  
 Hypothesis 6: Induced thought-action fusion will lead to higher levels of perceived 
responsibility, which will, in turn, lead to higher scores on the dependent variables. 
Therefore, the relationship between experimentally-induced thought-action fusion and 
button-pressing, anxiety and thought-control will be mediated by experimentally-induced 
responsibility beliefs.  
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Chapter 2 
Method 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview  
 This chapter describes the method used in the study. The design is explained, along with 
details about participants and the experimental task. Ethical considerations are discussed. The 
measures used, along with their psychometric properties are described. Finally, the procedure is 
described. 
 
2.2 Design 
 A between-groups experimental design was used. The independent variable was induced 
thought-action fusion, with two levels of manipulation: thought-action fusion (experimental group) 
and no thought-action fusion (control group). Children were allocated to the two experimental 
conditions using a computerised method; this allocated at random while balancing age and gender 
between the control and experimental groups. The effect of experimental condition on several 
different dependent variables was examined: 
1. level of anxiety 
2. number of „disconnect‟ button presses 
3. level of thought-control 
4. perception of thought-action fusion 
5. perception of responsibility for harm and severity of harm 
 
2.3 Participants 
Participants were 85 school children aged 9 to 11. This age group was selected because 
previous research has indicated that magical thinking and thought-action fusion are high in this age 
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group, before dropping in early adolescence (Bolton et al., 2002; Laing et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
research indicates that children of this age have developed responsibility beliefs, so this was thought 
to be an appropriate age to look at how thought-action fusion might be influenced by responsibility 
appraisals (Barrett & Healy, 2003). It was also felt that the premise of the experiment was more 
likely to be believed in this age group, compared to older children. 
 2.3.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
 Children were included if they were aged between 9 and 11 and were fluent in English. 
Children were excluded if they had recognised special educational needs (as determined by a 
teacher), as this could affect their ability to complete questionnaires or their performance on the 
task. Children who were colour blind (as determined by a parent) were also excluded, as this would 
affect their ability to participate in the task. Children were also excluded if they were known to have 
epilepsy (as determined by a parent) as the task involved rapidly changing bright images. If children 
scored above a cut-off on an anxiety measure, they underwent a modified version of the experiment, 
designed not to induce anxiety (Appendix M), and their results were not included in the analysis. 
 2.3.2 Sample size. 
 This study could be considered a preliminary study of a new experimental method. It was 
difficult to determine the necessary sample size, because there are few similar studies. Rassin et al. 
(1999) told subjects in their experimental group that thinking the word „apple‟ could result in 
another participant receiving an electric shock. The study found effect sizes of 0.9 for intrusive 
thoughts of the word „apple‟ and of 1.4 for efforts to avoid thinking of the word „apple‟. As in the 
present study, participants were able to press a „signal interrupting‟ button if they had a thought that 
could be harmful. They found that subjects felt „fairly‟ responsible and pressed a „signal-
interrupting‟ button on average 5.2 times, but did not measure these variables in a control group, so 
no effect size can be estimated. In a study manipulating responsibility appraisals in children aged 9–
11, Reeves, Reynolds, Coker and Wilson (2010) found effect sizes ranging from 0.27–0.64.  
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Assuming an effect size of 0.5 for the dependent variables of button-pressing, thought-control and 
responsibility,  then 100 participants would be needed to find a difference between the groups if 
power is 0.8 and statistical significance 0.05. See Appendix A for power calculation. 
 2.3.3 Recruitment of participants. 
 All participants in this study were recruited from schools in Cambridgeshire. Forty schools 
were chosen from the list of Cambridgeshire Schools provided by Cambridgeshire County Council 
on their webpage. Schools were initially selected randomly. However, a number of urban schools in 
a large city chose not to participate due to the frequency of research requests in the area. For this 
reason, no further schools in this area were contacted. One school was selected because the 
researcher had links with a teacher there. Schools were contacted in batches of five and 
headteachers were given information about the study by letter (appendices C and D). The letter was 
then followed up by a phone call one week later. Four schools expressed an interest in the study. 
The researcher arranged to meet the headteacher at each of these schools to go through the study 
and answer any questions. All four schools then agreed to participate and will be referred to as 
primary schools A, B, C and D (see Appendix B for information about the schools). 
 The researcher spoke in assembly to the relevant year groups, talking about psychological 
research, briefly describing the study and inviting children to take part. An information pack for 
parents explaining the project and inviting them to take part was taken home by each child aged 9–
11. The information pack contained a parent information sheet (Appendix E), a demographic 
questionnaire (Appendix F) and a parent consent form (Appendix G). Children were given an 
information sheet at school by their teachers (Appendix H). Parents were informed that for each 
child who participated a £2 book voucher would be given to the school. For primary school A, 136 
packs were sent out to children aged 9–11. For primary school B, 92 were sent, for primary school 
C, 21 were sent and for primary school D, 25 were sent. Twenty-one consent forms were returned 
33 
 
from primary school A (14.7%), 45 from primary school B (48.9%), 8 from primary school C (38.1 
%) and 15 from primary school D (60%). There was a combined response rate of 32.5%. Results 
from four children were not included for the following reasons: one child closed his eyes during the 
experiment and was unable to complete the final measure; one child's data was lost due to a 
computer error; one child scored above the cut-off for anxiety and one child was not able to 
conform to the experimental task. Incomplete data were gathered from one further child because, in 
consultation with the school, two measures were not deemed appropriate due to the child's personal 
circumstances. 
 2.3.4 Demographic data. 
 The children who participated in the study, and whose results could be included, were 85  
school children aged 9 years 0 months to 11 years 10 months (mean = 10 years 2 months). 38 were 
male (44.7%) and 47 were female (55.3%). Full demographic details of the sample are reported in 
the results section 3.3. 
 
2.4 Experimental Task 
The task was loosely adapted from the task developed by Rassin et al. (1999). Their task was 
designed to induce thought-action fusion in adults by telling participants that a helmet could pick up 
their thoughts. The experimental group were then told that if they thought the word „apple‟ another 
participant would be given an electric shock. The „thought-action fusion‟ beliefs of the participants 
were based on the instruction of the experimenter, rather than on feedback from the computer and 
there was no measure of the strength of participants' belief in the instruction. Furthermore, a 
specific „dangerous‟ thought was suggested, strongly encouraging thought suppression in the 
experimental group. Finally, the task was anxiety-provoking and would not be considered ethical 
with young children.  
 The current study differed from that of Rassin et al. (1999) by aiming to provide children 
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with visual feedback about the power of their thoughts to see how likely they were to believe this. 
The task was considered to have face validity as many children know about cutting-edge computer-
gaming technology where helmets are used to allow a player to control aspects of a game with their 
thoughts. Furthermore, the absence of a direct instruction would make it possible to see whether the 
task was more likely to induce thought-action fusion beliefs in some children than in others. Finally, 
rather than suggesting a specific „dangerous‟ thought, which would be more likely to cause thought 
suppression, the study sought to find out whether children did believe that their thoughts could 
cause harm and how they would respond. Pilot work was undertaken with 5 children aged 9–11 to 
determine whether the task was successful at manipulating thought-action fusion, whether 
adaptations were necessary and whether questionnaires were age-appropriate. The details of the task 
outlined below are the results of piloting work undertaken. The experiment had two phases: 
2.4.1 Phase 1: Induction of positive thought-action fusion. 
 Children were told that they would be asked to “put on a special helmet, think hard about the 
colour red and try to change some pictures on the computer screen”. It was explained that “we are 
doing research to find out how well the helmet works and what you think about the task”. The 
helmet (see figure 1) and its design are described in more detail in section 2.4.3. Children were told: 
“You are going to see a series of pictures come up on the screen one after another. Think hard about 
the colour red; try to visualise it in your mind. The computer will try to pick up on what you're 
thinking and begin to turn the pictures red. It won't work straight away, because the computer needs 
time to tune in and it doesn't always work so don't be disappointed. Just try your hardest.” 
 Children were told that the computer wouldn't pick up on their thoughts straight away both 
to make the task more realistic and also to give children something to compare the later pictures 
with, to make it easier for them to judge whether or not they were „successful‟. Children in the 
experimental and control group saw the same series of 60 images, selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). Details of the pictures are described in 
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section 2.4.3. Images were shown at the rate of 1 per 1.1 seconds, so this part of the experiment 
lasted just over 1 minute. This length of time was chosen because, for the experiment to be 
convincing, children in the experimental group had to be concentrating on red for the entire time. 
During piloting, 1 minute was found to be an appropriate length of time. Thought-action fusion was 
manipulated as follows: 
 
(1) Experimental group: Induced thought-action fusion 
 In the experimental group, these images were tinted as described in Appendix I. The tinting was 
designed so that pictures became, on average, increasingly red, but the increase varied around a 
mean. This was done to make the experiment more convincing: so that children would be more 
likely to feel that the computer was genuinely responding to their thoughts and they were becoming 
increasingly good at influencing it. Pictures did not turn very red too quickly so that children were 
more likely to continue to concentrate and think „red‟ all the way to the end. If children stopped 
thinking about red and the pictures continued to change, it was expected that this would undermine 
their belief in their ability to influence the computer. 
 
(2) Control group: no induced thought-action fusion 
Children in the control group saw the un-tinted images, some of which happened to have red in 
them. 
 Phase 1 was designed to give children in the experimental group evidence that their thoughts 
could affect the computer in a positive way, by turning the pictures red (positive thought-action 
fusion). 
2.4.2 Phase 2: Suggestion of harm. 
 During the second phase of the experiment, children in both groups were asked to keep the 
helmet on and told “The computer just needs to take some background readings. You don't have to 
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think about anything in particular, but if the computer is sensitive to your thoughts, it can be 
damaged by surges of energy and the equipment is very expensive. When I click „next‟ [to move the 
computer on] you will see a big button that says „disconnect‟. If you have a thought you're worried 
might damage the computer, please press the disconnect button. You can press it every time you 
have a thought you are worried might damage the computer.” This part of the experiment was 
designed to make the children concerned that their thoughts might be damaging to the computer. 
The button-pressing measure was designed to be a way to measure whether the positive thought-
action fusion induced in the experimental group made this group more concerned about the 
suggestion of harm.  
 After one minute, that part of the task ended and the children alerted the researcher and were 
asked to remove the helmet. 
 2.4.3 IAPS picture selection. 
 The International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 2005) was developed to provide a 
normative set of colour photographs rated for emotional arousal. The pictures are rated on affective 
valence (from unpleasant to pleasant), arousal (from calm to excited). They are also rated on 
dominance, which is a third, less strong, factor identified as accounting for variance in emotional 
assessments (Osgood, Suci, & Tanenbaum, 1957). Pictures which were both neutral in valence – 
which the authors define as those scored at or near the mid-line for valence – and low in arousal 
were selected as possible candidates for this study. This was because pictures should not be 
unpleasant or anxiety provoking for ethical reasons, and it was felt that they should be as affect-
neutral as possible.  
 Suitable pictures were defined as those which scored between 4.5 and 6.5 on valence and 
below 6 for arousal. This range was above the mid-point because many pictures rated lower than 4.5 
by adults contained content unsuitable for children. From this pool of pictures, any regarded as 
being unsuitable for children because of (1) nakedness, (2) sexual content (however mild) or (3) 
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violence (however mild) were excluded. Pictures which were judged to be too red were also 
excluded, as these could undermine the difference between the experimental and control groups. 
From the remaining pictures, 60 were selected at random (appendices J and K). 
 2.4.4 Helmet. 
 The helmet was designed by a professional model maker, loosely based on the design of a 
mind-control headset called the Emotive EPOC, by Emotiv Systems. It was made of moulded 
plastic, with a wire coming from the back which could plug in to a USB port in a laptop. The 
structure was flexible and designed to fit different head sizes and shapes (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Helmet 
 
2.5 Ethical Considerations 
 Ethical approval was obtained from the University of East Anglia Faculty of Health 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix L for approval letter). Careful consideration was given 
to the potential ethical issues connected with this research, both because it involved children and 
because some deception was involved. The study considered guidelines from the British 
Psychological Society and the Medical Research Council. The researcher consulted with parents 
when planning the experiment and asked for feedback from parents and children during the piloting 
stage. Changes were made to the parent information sheet following feedback. 
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 2.5.1 Consent. 
 Parents were provided with an information sheet describing the research (Appendix E). This 
explained exactly what the procedure would involve and how long it would take. It was made clear 
that children would be told that the helmet could pick up their thoughts, although this was not true. 
The reasons for this were explained. A telephone number was provided so parents could contact the 
researcher. Parents returned a consent form along with a demographic questionnaire if they gave 
permission for their child to be involved.  
 Children were provided with an age-appropriate information sheet. When they met with the 
researcher, this sheet was read to them, or by them again. The researcher then gave them the 
opportunity to ask questions. Children were told that they did not have to take part, even though 
their parents had signed the consent forms. They were also told they could change their minds at 
any time, without giving a reason. Children completed assent forms if they wanted to take part.  
 2.5.2 Deception. 
 Where possible, deception was avoided. However, in order for the experimental 
manipulation to be successful, children had to believe that the helmet was real. This meant that 
children had to be somewhat deceived about the purpose of the study. They were told, truthfully, 
that the researcher wanted to know their thoughts and feelings about the task, but they were also 
told that the researcher wanted to see how they went about using the helmet and how well it 
worked. Children were fully debriefed, either immediately after they had finished the task or at the 
end of the school day, about the real purpose of the study and the fact the helmet was pretend 
(Appendix T). The BPS Committee (2006) concluded that the central factor was the reaction of the 
participants when the deception was revealed. If this led to discomfort, anger, or objections, then the 
deception was inappropriate. The task was piloted on 5 children and none became distressed or felt 
angry when full information was given. During the debrief, the researcher explained to children 
clearly that the helmet was pretend, but stressed that it was designed to look just like helmets that 
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can really pick up thoughts, so that it was very convincing and adults believed it too. This was done 
to minimise the chance that children would feel embarrassed that they had been „tricked‟. It was 
also explained that some children had seen the pictures change and some had not and this was why 
some children believed the helmet worked and some did not. The debriefing process involved 
discussing the children's experience of the task, asking about their thoughts about the deception and 
checking for any distress, anger or unforeseen consequences. A small number of children said they 
were a bit disappointed that the helmet was not real, but all children said they were glad they took 
part and agreed to keep the „secret‟ of the helmet.  
 The BPS (2006) also recommends that participants are provided with sufficient information 
at the earliest possible stage. No participant went home without being debriefed. The BPS 
recommends that researchers should consult appropriately about the way the deception will be 
received. This was done both during piloting, and by giving full information to parents, who would 
be more able to predict whether their child might become upset. 
 2.5.3 Managing distress. 
 The task was administered with the intent of minimising distress. This was done in the 
following ways: 
1) The researcher was able to minimise anxiety by building rapport with children when they 
were in small groups to talk about the research and complete the initial measures. When the 
researcher collected each child from their class, she was able to chat to each child briefly to 
put them at ease. 
2) The children's scores on the Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children were checked by 
the researcher before each child did the task. One child was above the cut-off score, 
suggesting they might be experiencing clinical levels of anxiety. This child was given an 
alternative version of the task, which did not induce anxiety (Appendix M), so that she did 
not feel excluded. Her parents were written to and informed of their child's higher than usual 
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score (Appendix N). 
3) At the start of the task, children were told that “the helmet does not always work” to 
minimise disappointment if a child happened to be in the control group.  
4) Children were also given a „STOP‟ card and told they could hold this up at any time, or they 
could wave their hand or call the researcher if they wanted to stop.  
5) Children completed visual analogue anxiety scales before the start of the task, after the first 
stage and at the end and called the researcher over each time these appeared. This provided 
the researcher with another way of telling if any child had become very anxious. 
If a child had shown distress, the task would have been discontinued, the child comforted and the 
teacher informed. No child showed distress. 
 2.5.4 Confidentiality. 
 Data was managed in accordance with the Data Protection Act. Raw data, including 
questionnaire results, were kept in a locked cupboard. All participants were identified by identity 
numbers held in a separate location. Schools, parents and children were informed that they would 
not be identified in any reports of the research. 
 
2.6 Measures 
 2.6.1 Demographic questionnaire. 
 A demographic questionnaire was used, based on that used by Reeves et al. (2010) 
(Appendix N). This asked for information about age, gender and ethnic origin, as well as colour-
blindness and epilepsy. Parents completed the demographic questionnaire along with the consent 
form.   
 2.6.2 Independent variable measures. 
 2.6.2.1 The multidimensional anxiety scale for children -short form (MASC-10; March, 
Parker, Sullivan, Stallings, & Conners, 1997). 
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 The short form of the MASC is a 10 item self-report measure, intended to be a short and 
efficient global measure of anxiety symptoms in children aged 8–19. It consists of 10 short 
statements with which children can rate their agreement on a 4-point scale from 1 (never) to 4 
(often). It has been shown to distinguish between anxiety and depression in a clinical sample of 
children (Rynn et al., 2006). Test-retest reliability ranges from 0.64 to 0.89, indicating satisfactory 
to excellent stability. Internal reliability is satisfactory. The test was used as a general anxiety 
measure and to identify highly anxious children who would be unsuitable for this study. The MASC 
Technical Manual (March, 1997) states that T-scores above 65 are likely to represent clinically 
significant symptoms in a „high base rate group‟. However, the manual suggests using a higher T-
score of 70 or 75 in a low base rate group such as a population of children without identified 
behavioural problems. For this reason, a T-score of 70 was selected as a cut-off for this study. This 
translated to a score of 24 or above in girls and 21 or above for boys, out of a maximum score of 30. 
This measure is not included in the appendices because permission has not been given by the 
copyright holder. 
 2.6.2.2 Responsibility attitude scale: Adapted version (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000). 
The RAS is a 26 item questionnaire which measures general beliefs or assumptions related 
to inflated responsibility in adults. It has been shown to have good test-retest reliability (r=.94) and 
high internal consistency (α=.92) (Salkovskis et al., 2000). A number of studies have adapted this 
questionnaire to use with a younger population. Mather and Cartwright-Hatton (2004) found the 
RAS to be a reliable measure in an adolescent population aged 13–17 years, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.90. An adapted version of the RAS (Appendix O) is a 20-item questionnaire, which 
had been used with children aged 10 to 18 (Reeves et al., 2010). It has an internal consistency of 
α=0.78, which demonstrates acceptable reliability (Reeves et al.). Scores range from 20–140 with a 
lower score indicating a higher level of inflated responsibility. Reeves et al. reported that the mean 
score for 9–12 year olds was 69.68. This version was used to measure and control for inflated 
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responsibility beliefs. During piloting, two 9 year-old children did not understand two items. One 
item was changed from „I will be condemned for my actions‟ to „people will think very badly of me 
for my actions‟. One further item was changed from „I often nearly cause harm‟ to „there are often 
times when I nearly cause harm‟. 
 2.6.2.3 Thought-action fusion questionnaire: Adolescent version (TAFQ-A; Muris, 
Meesters, Rassin, Merckelbach, & Campbell, 2001). 
 The TAFQ-A (Appendix P) was based on the Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire – 
Revised (Shafran et al., 1996). It was designed for teenagers and consists of 15 brief vignettes 
followed by a statement; respondents mark their level of agreement with this on a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 4 (very true). The Morality subscale includes 8 items and the 
Likelihood subscale includes 7 items. A reliability of 0.84 has been demonstrated for adolescents 
aged 13–16. This scale has not been normed for younger children but the language used is 
consistent with that used in the other measures. Following piloting, part of one item was changed 
from „stay down a class at school‟ to „repeat a year at school‟. 
 2.6.3 Measures of dependent variables. 
 2.6.3.1 Visual-analogue anxiety measure (Bernstein and Garfinkel, 1992). 
 This is a single item measure (Appendix Q) taken from the Visual Analogue Scale for 
Anxiety-Revised (VAA-R). This item was computerised and children were asked to indicate, using 
a mouse pointer, their anxiety level from 0–100, by placing a mark on a continuous line to show 
how „jittery/nervous‟ or „steady‟ they feel „right now‟. A score of 100 represents „steady‟, so this 
item is reverse scored, with low numbers representing greater anxiety. It is a short measure for state 
anxiety in children aged 8–18 years. This single item has been found to be sensitive to changes in 
anxiety in children across short time periods (Bernstein et al., 1994). Visual analogue mood scales 
have been shown to correlate with other mood measure and are especially sensitive to short-term 
changes in mood (Lindsay & Powell, 1994). 
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 2.6.3.2 Measure of induced thought-action fusion, responsibility, thought-control and 
reason for button-pressing (Likert scale measure). 
To measure induced thought-action fusion, responsibility beliefs, thought-control and 
reasons for button-pressing, 10 statements were used. Children could rate their agreement on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 0 (completely disagree) to 4 (completely agree) (Appendix R). 
Questions 1-3 were designed by the researcher to test the success of the first part of the 
experimental manipulation. This section of the measure will be referred to as „induced thought-
action fusion‟. Question 4 was designed to assess participant‟s belief in the second part of the 
manipulation: the suggestion that their thoughts could cause damage to the computer. This question 
will be referred to as „probability of harm‟. Questions 5-7 were based upon items used by Reeves et 
al. (2010). These measured severity of harm and responsibility for harm and this section of the 
measure will be referred to as „responsibility‟. Question 8 evaluated thought-control. This question 
was added part-way through testing after the first 21 participants. To establish why children had 
pressed the „disconnect‟ button, questions 9 and 10 were used. These questions were designed by 
the researcher to establish whether children pressed the button in response to thoughts they were 
concerned about or whether they pressed it „just in case‟. They were completed only by children 
who had pressed the „disconnect‟ button. These items were tested during piloting and found to be 
age appropriate. 
 2.6.4 Behavioural Measure: Button-pressing. 
 During the second phase of the experiment, children could see a „button‟ on the computer 
screen labelled „disconnect‟. They were asked to click on this button with the mouse pointer if they 
had a thought they were worried could damage the computer. This measure is based on that used by 
Rassin et al. (1999). The computer recorded the number of times the „button‟ was pressed. 
  
2.7 Procedure 
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Pilot work was carried out with 5 children aged 9–11. For the main study, children were 
recruited from four primary schools in Cambridgeshire. The researcher spoke to children aged 9–11 
in school assembly about psychology and this research study. Children were asked to take 
information packs home to their parents. Parents were asked to return the demographic 
questionnaire and consent forms to the school office in the envelope provided by a given date. They 
were asked not to give all the information about the study to their children, even if they did not want 
to take part. When the agreed date for the return of consent forms had passed, the researcher met 
with a teacher from the school to check that all children met inclusion criteria. The teacher also 
advised the researcher on which order to take the children. This was guided by school schedules but 
also by the teacher's knowledge of the children. Children who the teacher felt would find it hard to 
keep the information about the helmet a secret were the last in their classes to participate. This was 
done to minimise the chance that children would inform each other about the experiment. 
 Children whose parents had completed consent forms met with the researcher in groups of 5. 
Children identified by teachers as needing more support with their reading were met individually or 
in pairs, according to their teacher's guidance. Each child was given an information sheet to read, or 
it was read out by the researcher (see Appendix S for task instructions). They were encouraged to 
ask questions and it was emphasised that they did not have to take part. Children who were happy to 
take part signed an assent form and were each given a participant number, which they wrote on all 
measures. Children then completed the MASC-10, RAS and TAFQA.  
 Children in groups decided, with some support from the researcher, in which order they 
wanted to take part. Each child then completed the experiment while the rest of their group were in 
class, to minimise distraction and the time children were away from their lessons. Children were 
randomly allocated to the experimental or control group by the computer, once their age, gender and 
participant number had been entered. The researcher was blind to this allocation. Before the task 
began, children completed a computerised version of the visual analogue anxiety measure. Children 
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were then given instructions (Appendix S) and asked to click „next‟ when they were ready to start.  
 The researcher sat directly behind the child, in a position that made it impossible to see the 
computer screen, but so that, if the child raised the „STOP‟ card, the researcher would notice. The 
computer programme ran the first part of the experiment (Phase 1). When this finished, a message 
on the computer asked the child to tell the researcher they had finished. The researcher then moved 
the screen on, and the child was asked to complete the visual analogue anxiety measure for the 
second time. The researcher then explained the next part of the experiment to the child (Phase 2; 
Appendix S). When this part finished, the computer screen moved to the final visual analogue 
anxiety measure and the child was asked to tell the researcher they had finished. The child was then 
reassured that the computer was not damaged and asked to complete the final Likert scale measure. 
 At the end of the school day, or immediately after the whole group had completed the task, 
depending on the wishes of the school, the children were debriefed in their groups (Appendix T). 
Children chose a small toy to thank them for participating and the school received a £2 book 
voucher for each child that participated. If the children were not the last in the school to participate, 
they were asked if they had enjoyed the experiment and if they could keep the „secret‟ of the 
helmet, so that other children could take part as well.  
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Chapter 3 
Results 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 The first section describes how data were made suitable for analysis, including screening for 
normality and missing data. The second section describes demographic data, including the age, 
gender and ethnic origin of participants. The internal consistencies of the TAFQ-A questionnaire are 
presented in the third section, because this is a new measure for this age group. Internal 
consistencies of the induced thought-action fusion and responsibility subscales developed for the 
study are also presented. Section four has descriptive data for each measure used in the main 
analysis. This describes whether data were normally distributed and which data transformations 
were used. The fifth section compares the experimental and control groups on the confounding 
variables of age, gender, thought-action fusion beliefs, inflated responsibility beliefs and anxiety. 
Section six tests the research hypotheses. This begins with the results of the induced thought-action 
fusion measure, to check whether the manipulation was successful. The experimental and control 
groups are then compared on the dependent variables. Section seven presents some further analyses 
of the data. The chapter concludes with a summary of the results and addresses each research 
hypothesis in turn. 
 
3.2 Treatment of Data 
 The data were entered into SPSS version 16 and screened for outliers. Unusual variables 
were checked again the original questionnaire responses to rule out data entry mistakes. The data set 
was also screened for missing data. There were four incidents of missing data; one computerised 
measure of anxiety for three participants was lost due to computer error. One participant did not 
complete the RAS or TAFQA because her teacher did not feel these measures were appropriate for 
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her, for personal reasons. The measure for thought-control was not completed by children at the first 
school tested, so only 67 participants completed this measure. 
 
3.3 Demographic Data 
 The demographic characteristics of the sample and each of the experimental groups was 
explored. Table 2 shows the gender distribution of the whole sample and each of the experimental 
groups. Pearson's Chi-Square test was used to check whether there was an association between 
gender and group. There was no significant association (χ² (1) = 0.01,  p = 0.59). 
Table 2 
Frequency of Males and Females for the Whole Sample and Both Groups 
 N Males  Females 
Whole sample 85 38 47 
Experimental group 42 19 23 
Control group 43 19 24 
  
 The mean age of participants was 10 years 2 months (SD = 9.92 months) and the range was 
9 years to 11 years 10 months (Table 3). Age was included as a variable in a MANOVA to test for 
differences between independent variables (section 3.6). There was no significant difference in age 
between the groups (F=0.063, p=0.803). The demographic characteristics of the 67 children who 
completed the thought-control question, along with analyses comparing the groups on age and 
gender are shown in Appendix U. The groups for this sample did not differ on age or gender. 
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Table 3 
Mean Age for the Whole Sample and Both Groups 
 N Mean age (months) SD 
Whole sample 85 122 9.92 
Experimental group 42 122.29 9.89 
Control group 43 121.72 10.06 
 
 The ethnic origin of the whole sample was also explored. Two children were of Asian origin 
(2.4%) and the rest were of White British origin (97.6%). Information was also collected on 
epilepsy and colour-blindness, and no children were reported to have either of these conditions. 
  
3.4 Internal Consistency of the Questionnaire Measures 
 The internal consistencies of the new and non-standardised measures were tested. The 
TAFQ-A is a new measure for children of this age and the measures of induced thought-action 
fusion and responsibility for harm were designed by the researcher for this study. The single 
question measure of thought-control could not be checked for internal consistency. The internal 
consistencies were calculated using Cronbach's alpha (Table 4). An alpha (α) of above 0.80 is 
considered to indicate good internal consistency (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). All the measures had 
good internal consistency. 
Table 4 
Internal Consistency of Measures 
Measure Alpha (α) 
TAFQA-Likelihood 0.84 
TAFQA-Morality 0.80 
Induced thought-action fusion 0.89 
Responsibility (3 items) 0.81 
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3.5 Descriptive Data 
 This section presents the descriptive data for the independent variables (Table 5) and the 
dependent variables (Table 6). Histograms and boxplots were plotted to examine the data visually 
and check for outliers. Skewness and kurtosis was checked for each variable. All independent 
variables were normally distributed apart from the likelihood subscale of the TAFQA and the VAS 
at Time 1 in the whole sample. These had significant levels of skew as z-scores were above 1.96 
(p<0.05).  
Table 5 
Descriptive Data for the Independent Variables 
 Experimental Group¹ Control Group² Whole Sample³ 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Skew Kurtosis Mean 
(SD) 
Skew Kurtosis Mean 
(SD) 
Skew Kurtosis 
MASC-10 
 
10.81 
(5.38) 
0.02 0.03 11.02 
(5.16) 
0.23 -0.53 10.92 
(5.24) 
0.11 -0.28 
RAS 
 
67.25 
(12.71) 
0.07 0.03 65.31 
(15.16) 
0.16 0.32 66.42 
(13.95) 
0.09 -0.06 
TAFQA 
 
31.40 
(8.08) 
-0.06 -0.66 30.67 
(8.22) 
0.63 -0.41 31.04 
(8.12) 
0.29 -0.66 
TAFQA 
Likelihood 
12.79 
(4.83) 
0.65 -0.41 12.40 
(3.98) 
0.68 0.42 12.60 
(4.40) 
0.68* -0.07 
TAFQA 
Morality 
18.62 
(5.13) 
0.16 -0.14 18.26 
(5.34) 
0.57 -0.38 18.44 
(5.16) 
0.36 -0.35 
VAS1 
 
26.36 
(24.00) 
-0.69 -0.23 27.09 
(26.40) 
-0.69 -0.43 26.73 
(25.09) 
-0.68* -0.37 
*p<0.05 
¹N=42; ²N=43 for MASC-10 and VAS1, N=42 for other variables; ³N=85 for MASC-10 and VAS1, N=84 for other 
variables 
 
 
  Table 6 includes a measure of anxiety change. This represents the change in anxiety, 
measured on the VAS, during the second phase of the task, when children were told that it was 
possible for „high energy‟ thoughts to damage the computer. A positive score represents an increase 
in anxiety. Significant levels of skew or kurtosis, with z-scores over 1.96, indicated that the 
following variables were not normally distributed in the groups: probability of harm question, 
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responsibility questions, thought-control question, VAS2, VAS3, anxiety change and button-
pressing. There were no significant outliers, as none of the z-scores were greater than 3.29 or less 
than -3.29 (Field, 2005). 
Table 6 
Descriptive Data for the Dependent Variables 
 Experimental Group¹ Control Group² Whole Sample³ 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Skew Kurtosis Mean 
(SD) 
Skew Kurtosis Mean 
(SD) 
Skew Kurtosis 
Induced TAF 9.21 
(1.99) 
-0.56 -0.03 4.12 
(2.48) 
-0.08 -0.88 6.64 
(3.40) 
-0.27 -0.86 
Probability of 
harm 
1.12 
(1.21) 
097* 0.20 0.84 
(0.90) 
0.75* -0.36 0.98 
(1.07) 
1.01* 0.51 
Responsibility 
 
8.07 
(2.98) 
-0.98 -0.97 7.79 
(3.01) 
-0.59 -0.28 7.93 
(2.98) 
-0.77* 0.20 
Thought-
Control 
3.51 
(0.74) 
-1.65* 2.77* 2.91 
(1.35) 
-1.24 0.46 3.22 
(1.11) 
-1.69* 2.34* 
VAS2 
 
18.67 
(17.01) 
0.45 -0.81 26.11 
(22.24) 
0.41 -0.78 22.44 
(20.06) 
0.55* -0.50 
VAS3 
 
16.65 
(20.81) 
1.38* 1.79* 23.62 
(22.45) 
0.57 -0.76 20.22 
(21.81) 
0.90* 0.016 
Anxiety 
Change 
-2.95 
(17.80) 
0.84* 8.83* -2.81 
(14.96) 
-0.45 3.06* -2.88 
(16.30) 
0.49 6.60* 
Button- 
Pressing 
0.57 
(2.35) 
5.94 36.96 0.14 
(0.64) 
5.61* 33.49* 0.35 
(1.72) 
7.72* 65.02* 
*p<0.05 
¹N=42 except for VAS3 where N=40; ²N=43 except for VAS3 where N=42; ³N=85 except for VAS3 where N=82. 
 
 Where data were not normally distributed, appropriate transforms were tried. Responsibility 
was reflected, anchored at 1, and a square root transform applied. This was then reflected back so 
that data retained its original order. New values of skew and kurtosis are reported in Table 7. A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality and Levene's test for equality of variance were non-
significant, demonstrating that the equality of variance and normality assumptions necessary for 
parametric analyses were met.  
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Table 7  
Skewness and Kurtosis for Transformed Variables 
 Experimental Group Control Group 
 
 
Skew SE Kurtosis SE Skew SE Kurtosis SE 
 
Responsibility 
 
-0.210 0.365 -0.226 0.717 0.057 0.361 -0.562 0.709 
  
 Transforms on the measure for probability of harm, thought-control, VAS anxiety and 
anxiety change did not improve the distribution so non-parametric analyses were used for these 
variables. The likelihood subscale of the TAFQA was not transformed as it was normally distributed 
in the groups, allowing for parametric comparison. Button-pressing was re-coded as a categorical 
variable (Table 8). This was considered to be more appropriate as only 10 children had pressed the 
disconnect button and the data was extremely non-normal.  
Table 8 
Button-Pressing as a Categorical Variable 
 N Pressers Non-Pressers 
Whole sample 85 10 75 
Experimental group 42 7 35 
Control group 43 3 40 
 
3.6 Comparisons between Experimental and Control Groups on Age and Independent 
Variable Measures 
 Participants were matched across the groups for age and gender, however, data from some 
participants could not be included, so it was important to check that the matching had been 
successful and the groups did not differ on age or gender. Groups were not matched for anxiety, 
responsibility beliefs or prior thought-action fusion beliefs, so it was important to determine 
whether they differed significantly on any of these variables.  
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 TAFQA, the morality and likelihood subscales of the TAFQA, RAS MASC-10 and VAS at 
Time 1 were compared using a MANOVA (Table 9). MANOVA was used to reduce Type 1 error 
and to maximise power (Field, 2005). Cases were excluded listwise, and there was missing data for 
one participant. Therefore the total number in the analysis was 84. The variables met the 
assumptions of MANOVA as outlined by Field (2005). The data were randomly sampled and 
normally distributed. Initial Levene's tests for homogeneity of variance were non-significant, 
indicating that the assumption of univariate normality was met. Box's test indicated that the 
covariance matrices were not significantly different in each group, F(21, 24731) = 1.205, p=0.23; 
therefore the assumption of homogeneity of covariance matrices was also met. The MANOVA was 
not significant – F(6,77) = 0.197, p=0.977.  
 The same variables were compared for the 67 participants who completed the thought-
control question (Appendix U). Groups were not significantly different, multivariate F(6,59) = 
0.036, p=1.000.  
Table 9 
Descriptive Data, Univariate F Values and p Values for the Independent Variables 
 Experimental Group Control Group F* P 
 Mean SD Mean SD   
Age 
(months) 
122.29 9.89 121.74 10.18 0.063 0.803 
MASC-10 
 
10.81 5.38 11.05 5.22 0.042 0.837 
RAS 
 
67.52 12.71 65.31 15.16 0.526 0.470 
TAFQA 
 
31.40 8.08 30.67 8.22 0.172 0.679 
TAFQA - 
likelihood 
12.79 4.83 12.40 3.98 0.156 0.694 
TAFQA - 
moral 
18.62 5.13 18.26 5.24 0.100 0.753 
VAS 1 73.64 24.00 73.52 26.40 0.000 0.983 
Note. N = 84 
*df(1, 82) 
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3.7 Interim Summary 
 The TAFQA morality and likelihood subscales, as well as the measures for responsibility 
and induced thought-action fusion all had good internal consistency. The measures for responsibility 
were divided into a single measure for probability of harm and another measure for responsibility 
and severity of harm. Some variables were not normally distributed and were transformed where 
possible. At baseline, participants in the two groups did not differ significantly on age, anxiety, 
thought-action fusion beliefs or responsibility beliefs. There was no significant association between 
group and gender. The next sections present the data analysis in relation to the specific research 
hypotheses. 
 
3.8 Induced Thought-Action Fusion Check 
 This study aimed to experimentally manipulate thought-action fusion beliefs. To check 
whether this was successful, the groups were compared on their scores on the subscale of induced 
thought-action fusion (Table 10). As this variable was normally distributed, a t-test was used. There 
was a significant between groups difference, t(83) = 10.43, p = 0.00; this represents a large effect 
size of 2.26 (Cohen, 1992) and indicates that the manipulation was successful.  
Table 10 
Comparison of Groups on Induced Thought-Action Fusion  
 Experimental Group Control Group t p Cohen's d 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
Induced 
TAF 
9.21 1.99 4.12 2.48 10.43 0.00 2.26 
 
3.9 Between Group Differences 
 Hypothesis 2 stated that children in the experimental group will show more button-pressing, 
experimentally induced responsibility, anxiety and thought-control. To test this hypothesis, non-
parametric Mann-Whitney tests were used for probability of harm, thought-control and anxiety 
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change (Table 11). A Bonferroni correction was applied, to reduce the chance of a Type 1 error, and 
the critical level of significance applied was 0.0125 (0.05/4 tests). There were no significant 
between groups differences. The difference between the control and experimental groups on 
thought-control was approaching significance.  
Table 11 
Group Differences on Dependent Variables using Mann-Whitney tests 
 Experimental Group Control Group U P 
(1 tailed) 
 Mean SD Mean SD   
Probability of harm 1.12 
 
1.21 0.84 0.90 812.50 0.200 
Thought-Control 
 
3.51 0.74 2.91 1.35 422.50 0.028 
Anxiety change -0.44 23.82 -2.81 14.96 833.00 0.399 
 
 A t-test was used for the transformed variables of responsibility (Table 12). T-tests have 
greater power than non-parametric alternatives. Rasch and Guiard (2004) used data-simulation 
techniques to show that the t-test is extremely robust to non-normality. They recommended its use 
even with small sample sizes. For this reason, a t-test was also used to test for a between groups 
difference in thought-control (Table 12). There was a significant between groups difference at the 
0.0125 level of significance (t=2.31, p=0.012); this represents a medium effect size of 0.55 (Cohen, 
1992). Figure 2 displays the mean thought-control for the groups.  
Table 12 
Group Differences on Thought-Control and Responsibility using t-tests 
 Experimental Group Control Group t p 
(1 tailed) 
 Mean SD Mean SD   
Thought-Control 
 
3.51 0.742 2.91 1.353 2.31 0.012 
Responsibility  8.07 2.98 7.79 3.01 0.169 0.341 
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Figure 2. Mean Score on Thought-Control for Both Groups 
 
 Button-pressing was re-coded as a categorical variable. In the experimental group 7 children 
pressed the button and 35 did not; in the control group 3 children pressed the button and 40 did not. 
A Pearson's Chi-Square test revealed no significant association between button-pressing and group 
membership, χ² (1) = 1.922, p = 0.083 (1-tailed). 
 
3.10 Associations between Thought-Action Fusion and Dependent Variables  
 Hypothesis 3 stated that induced thought-action fusion will be positively correlated with the 
dependent variables. To test this hypothesis, Pearson's and Spearman's rank correlations were 
performed across the whole sample and with both groups (Table 13). There was a significant 
correlation (ρ=0.401, p<0.001) between thought-control and induced thought-action fusion for the 
whole group and for the experimental group (ρ=0.436, p=0.004). No other significant correlations 
were found. The correlation between induced thought-action fusion and probability of harm in the 
control group approached significance (ρ=0.237, p=0.063).  
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Table 13 
Correlations between Induced Thought-Action Fusion and Dependent Variables 
 Induced Thought-Action Fusion 
 Whole Group¹ Experimental 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Thought-Control ¹ 0.401** 0.436** 0.215 
Probability of Harm¹ 0.132 -0.013 0.237 
Responsibility 0.003 -0.115 -0.057 
Anxiety Change¹ 0.046 -0.016 0.106 
**p<0.01, 1 tailed.  
¹Spearman's correlation coefficient 
 
 
3.11 Relationship between Likelihood TAFQA Score and Dependent Variables 
 Hypothesis 4 stated that children's initial level of likelihood thought-action fusion beliefs 
will contribute significantly to the variance of the outcome measures. To test this hypothesis, 
children's baseline thought-action fusion and the dependent variables, apart from button-pressing, 
were correlated using Pearson's and Spearman's rank correlations (Table 14). These were not 
significant, indicating that children's thought-action fusion beliefs at baseline did not predict 
obsessive-compulsive behaviours, thoughts or emotions. The correlation between likelihood 
TAFQA and probability of harm in the control group approached significance at the 0.05 level 
(ρ=0.248, p=0.057). 
Table 14 
Correlations between Likelihood TAFQA and Dependent Variables 
Likelihood 
TAFQA 
Responsibility Thought¹-
Control 
Anxiety¹ 
change 
Probability¹ 
of Harm 
Induced TAF 
Whole ¹ 
Sample 
0.030 0.044 0.103 0.032 -0.012 
Experimental 
Group 
-0.021 -0.059 0.136 -0.147 -0.084 
Control   
Group 
0.102 0.152 0.069 0.248 -0.094 
Note, N = 67 for thought-control, N=84 for other variables. 
¹Spearman's correlation coefficient 
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3.12 Testing for RAS as a Moderator 
 Hypothesis 5 stated that the relationship between experimentally induced thought-action 
fusion and the dependent variables will be moderated by initial responsibility beliefs. A significant 
relationship was found between induced thought-action fusion and thought-control in the whole 
sample and the experimental group so it was possible to test for a moderating relationship for these 
variables. Multiple regression using an interaction term calculated from centred variables is a 
preferred way to test for a moderating relationship (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Frazier, 
Tix, & Barron, 2004). This method maximises power by retaining the continuous nature of the 
variables. Following this procedure, the scores for RAS and thought-action fusion were centred to 
prevent multicolinearity in the data (Howell, 2002). The product of the centred variables of RAS 
and thought-action fusion was then calculated, to represent the interaction term. Before a regression 
analysis was done, exploratory correlations were calculated between the predictor variables, 
including the interaction term, and the outcome variable of thought-control (Table 15). The 
correlation between the interaction term and the dependent variable of thought-control was not 
significant for the whole group or the experimental group. This indicated that the relationship 
between thought-action fusion and thought-control did not change according to the level of 
responsibility, so responsibility was not a moderator. As this correlation was not significant, a 
regression analysis was not performed.  
Table 15 
Correlations between Predictor Variables and Thought-Control  
Thought-Control Responsibility Thought-Action Fusion Interaction 
Whole sample¹ 0.024 0.401** 0.005 
Experimental Group -0.008 0.436** 0.086 
N=67 
**p<0.01, 1 tailed. 
¹Spearman's correlation coefficient. 
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3.13 Testing for Perceived Responsibility as a Mediator 
 Hypothesis 6 stated that the relationship between thought-action fusion and the dependent 
variables would be mediated by perceived responsibility. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric 
resampling procedure which has been recommended for testing mediation because it has high 
power while maintaining control over type 1 error rate (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & 
Sheets, 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This method does not require normality in the sampling 
distribution and provides greater power than the causal steps method which is commonly used to 
investigate mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). A macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2008) was downloaded to 
carry out the procedure. Using this method, with 5000 samples, the 95% confidence interval for the 
size of the indirect effect of induced thought-action fusion on the dependent variables of thought-
control and anxiety change, through responsibility, was calculated. Button-pressing was not 
included in this analysis because of the small number of button presses in the study. Table 16 shows 
that all the confidence intervals include 0. Therefore the null hypothesis could not be rejected and 
responsibility was not found to mediate the relationship between thought-action fusion and the 
dependent variables. 
Table 16  
95% Confidence Intervals for Indirect Effect of Induced Thought-Action Fusion on Dependent 
Variables through Responsibility 
 Whole Group Experimental Group Control group 
Thought-control -0.024 0.011 -0.013 0.029 -0.015 0.026 
Anxiety change -0.211 0.139 -2.491 0.175 -2.657 0.152 
 
3.14 Further Analyses 
 Following tests for the main hypotheses, the data were examined further using post-hoc 
analyses.  
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3.14.1 Correlations among the independent variables.  
 Previous studies have found associations between responsibility, anxiety and thought-action 
fusion in children (Matthews et al., 2007; Muris et al., 2001). To establish whether scores on the 
independent variables were related to each other in a way that was consistent with previous 
literature, correlations between scores on the pre-task visual analogue anxiety scale (VAS anxiety), 
MASC-10, RAS, TAFQA, and the morality and likelihood subscales of the TAFQA were calculated 
(Table 17). For variables that were normally distributed Pearson's correlation coefficient was used, 
and for variables that were not normally distributed Spearman's rank correlation coefficient was 
used. 
 Scores on RAS are reversed, so that a low score indicates higher responsibility. There were 
significant positive correlations between scores on the MASC-10, TAFQA and the TAFQA 
subscales. The RAS was significantly negatively correlated with scores on the TAFQA, MASC-10 
and likelihood subscale of the TAFQA, indicating that higher levels of responsibility were 
associated with greater thought-action fusion and anxiety. The pre-task visual analogue anxiety 
scale was significantly correlated with the MASC-10, suggesting that it was a valid measure of 
anxiety. 
Table 17 
Correlations between Independent Variables 
 MASC-10 RAS TAFQA Morality  Likelihood¹ 
VAS Anxiety¹ 0.235* -0.089 -0.002 -0.073 0.073 
MASC-10  -0.186* 0.288** 0.184* 0.263** 
RAS   -0.388** -0.351 -0.313** 
TAFQA    0.872** 0.840** 
Morality      0.466** 
Note, N=85 for correlations with the MASC-10, N=84 for other correlations 
¹Spearman's correlation coefficient. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, 1 tailed. 
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3.14.2 Differences in anxiety across time. 
 Although anxiety change during the task (i.e. Time 2 to Time 3) was not significantly 
different between the groups, mean anxiety level at Time 1 appears to be higher than at times 2 or 3. 
This suggests that children may have got less anxious during the experiment. To establish whether 
anxiety level changed significantly over time and whether the change differed between groups, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the visual-analogue anxiety measure (Table 18). 
Although the VAS at Time 3 in the experimental group was not normally distributed, the model is 
robust to non-normality if group sizes are equal (Rasch & Guiard, 2004). Mauchley's test indicated 
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2= 11.13, p<0.05), therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.914). There was a 
significant main effect of time (F(1.83, 146.18) =5.778, p=0.005) but no significant group effect or 
interaction effect. 
Table 18 
Changes in Anxiety over Time 
Anxiety Experimental 
Group 
Control Group Time Group Time* group 
 Mean SD Mean  SD F p F p F p 
Pre-task 27.68 23.83 27.74 26.67       
During task 19.60 16.89 26.43 22.41 5.79 0.005 1.21 0.275 1.54 0.219 
Post-task 16.65 20.81 23.61 22.45       
N = 82 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that anxiety at Time 1 was significantly greater than at 
Time 3 (t = 2.957, p(2-tailed)=0.004). No other comparisons were significant. 
 3.14.3 Developmental differences in TAFQA scores. 
 This sample had higher scores on the TAFQA and both subscales, than the sample of 427 
13–16 year-olds used by Muris et al. (2001). T-tests were used to compare the two samples and test 
the null hypothesis that there was no significant difference between the means (Table 19). At 
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p=0.01, the current sample scored significantly higher on the TAFQA (t=10.65, p<0.01), the 
likelihood subscale (t=8.47, p<0.01) and the morality subscale (t=9.87, p<0.01). 
Table 19 
Comparison in TAFQA Scores between the Current Sample and Muris et. al. (2001) 
 Group N Mean SD t-value 
Whole Sample Current Study 84 31.04 8.12 10.65** 
 Muris et al. 427 22.2 6.4 
Likelihood Current Study  84 12.60 4.40 8.47** 
 Muris et al. 427 8.7 2.8  
Morality Current Study 84 18.44 5.16 9.87** 
 Muris et al. 427 13.4 4.9  
**p<0.01 
 Matthews et al. (2007) also used the TAFQA with a sample of 13-16 year olds and found 
very similar means of 22.44 (total) 13.55 (morality) and 8.89 (Likelihood) to those found by Muris 
et al. (2001). 
 3.14.4 Reason for button-pressing. 
 Ten children pressed the button and then answered the corresponding Likert scale questions 
about button-pressing. These were designed as a validation check, to make sure the children had 
pressed the button in response to intrusive thoughts. A high score on question 1 indicated that a 
child pressed the button because of a thought they were worried might damage the computer. A high 
score on question 2 indicated that a child pressed the button because they wanted „to be on the safe 
side‟. Each child answered both questions and some pressed the button more than once, so it was 
possible to have high scores on both. Table 20 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables in 
the group of 10 children who pressed the button. The variables did not have significant skewness or 
kurtosis, as z-scores were below 1.96 and therefore not significant at the 0.05 level. This indicated 
that they were normally distributed.  
 An exploratory t-test was done to see whether the difference in mean was significant (Table 
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20). A paired test was chosen, as the measures had similar units. Children scored significantly 
higher (t=2.45, p(2-tailed)=0.037) on the question about damage. As the sample was small, the 
analysis was repeated with a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test, which also revealed a 
significant difference (Z=-1.980, p(2-tailed)=0.048). 
Table 20 
Descriptive Statistics for Questions on Button-Pressing 
Question Mean SD Skew Kurtosis t p (2-tailed) 
Damage 3.5 0.707 -1.179 0.571 2.45 0.037 
'Safe Side' 1.9 1.60 -0.004 -1.589   
 
3.15 Chapter Summary 
 This section summarises the findings by considering each of the research hypotheses in turn, 
followed by the further analyses. 
 3.15.1 Hypothesis 1: Manipulation check.  
 This hypothesis stated that children in the thought-action fusion group will show higher 
levels of experimentally induced thought-action fusion than children in the control group. The 
results from the manipulation check indicated that the experiment was successful in manipulating 
thought-action fusion between the experimental and control group. Therefore, the hypothesis was 
supported. 
 3.15.2 Hypothesis 2: Between groups differences.  
 This hypothesis stated that children in the experimental group will show more button-
pressing, experimentally-induced responsibility, anxiety and thought-control. The experimental 
manipulation did not have a significant effect on any of the dependent variables when non-
parametric Mann-Whitney tests were used. The effect on thought-control approached significance. 
When a follow-up t-test was used, a between groups difference was found at the 0.0125 level. The 
hypothesis was therefore partially supported. A Chi-square test revealed a near-significant 
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association between button-pressing and group (p=0.083). 
 3.15.3 Hypothesis 3: Association between induced thought-action fusion and the 
dependent variables. 
 This hypothesis stated that there would be a significant positive correlation between induced 
thought-action fusion and the dependent variables. Spearman's rank's correlations showed that 
induced thought-action fusion was significantly correlated with thought-control in the whole sample 
(ρ=0.401) and the experimental group (ρ=0.436) and no other correlations were significant. 
Therefore the hypothesis was partially supported. The small correlation between induced thought-
action fusion and probability of harm approached significance in the control group (ρ=0.195, 
p=0.059.)  
 3.15.4 Hypothesis 4: Association between likelihood thought-action fusion and the 
dependent variables. 
 This hypothesis stated that children's initial level of likelihood thought-action fusion beliefs 
will contribute significantly to the variance of the outcome measures. There was no relationship 
between children's baseline thought-action fusion beliefs (likelihood TAFQA) and any of the 
outcome measures. Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported. The correlation between likelihood 
thought-action fusion and probability of harm approached significance in the control group.  
 3.15.5 Hypothesis 5: Moderation by responsibility beliefs. 
 The hypothesis stated that the relationship between experimentally-induced thought-action 
fusion and button-pressing, anxiety and thought-control will be moderated by responsibility beliefs. 
Moderation was tested for, following the procedure suggested by Frazier et al. (2004). No 
moderating relationship was found, therefore the hypothesis was not supported. 
 3.15.6 Hypothesis 6: Mediation by perceived responsibility. 
The hypothesis stated that the relationship between experimentally-induced thought-action 
fusion and button-pressing, anxiety and thought-control will be mediated by perception of 
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responsibility. Using a bootstrapping method to test the indirect effects of thought-action fusion on 
thought-control and anxiety change through responsibility, no indirect effect was found. Therefore 
the conditions for a mediating relationship were not met and the hypothesis was not supported. 
 3.15.7 Further analyses. 
 Correlations between the independent variables showed that responsibility likelihood 
thought-action fusion and anxiety were all intercorrelated. Anxiety was associated with morality 
thought-action fusion and both measures of anxiety were significantly correlated. 
 A non-parametric repeated measures ANOVA showed that there were significant differences 
in anxiety over time but there was no time by group interaction. Follow up comparisons showed 
that anxiety at Time 3 was significantly lower than at Time 1.  
 Comparison of the TAFQA scores for the current sample of 9–11 year olds revealed that 
average scores were significantly higher than a sample of 13–16 year olds (Muris et al., 2001) for 
both subscales and the total score.  
 A small number of children pressed the „disconnect‟ button and completed questions about 
their reasons for doing this. Data was checked for normality and a t-test revealed children were 
more likely to strongly endorse the question indicating they had pressed the button because of an 
intrusive thought than to be „on the safe side‟. 
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Chapter 4 
Discussion 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 This study aimed to test the causal relationship between thought-action fusion and OCD 
using an experimental manipulation of thought-action fusion in non-clinical children aged 9 to 11. 
The results of the study are discussed in this chapter. First the main results are summarised and 
evaluated in relation to the research hypotheses and further analyses. This is followed by a critique 
of the methodology used and the implications of this for interpretation (section 4.4). The theoretical 
and clinical implications of the findings are considered and directions for future research are 
suggested. Finally, an overall summary and main conclusions are presented. 
 
4.2 Evaluation of Findings 
 This section considers the results in relation to each of the research hypotheses and reviews 
them findings in relation to the current literature. The study reported here used a new experimental 
design to manipulate thought-action fusion, so there is limited previous research of direct relevance. 
Where possible, the findings will be related to research on thought-action fusion and OCD in 
children; at other times, links are made to research with adults. 
 4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Manipulation check. 
 This hypothesis stated that children in the thought-action fusion group will show higher 
levels of experimentally induced thought-action fusion than children in the control group. The 
results from the manipulation check indicated that the experiment was successful in manipulating 
thought-action fusion between the experimental and control group. Therefore the hypothesis was 
supported. 
 No previous experimental manipulations of thought-action fusion have measured 
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participants‟ belief in the manipulation (Bocci & Gordon, 2007; Rachman et al., 1996; Rassin, 
2001;  Rassin et al., 1999; van den Hout et al., 2001, 2002; Zucker et al., 2002). Thus the 
manipulation used is novel and appears to have potential value as a research technique. 
 4.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Between-groups differences. 
 Hypothesis 2 stated that children in the experimental group (i.e. with increased thought-
action fusion) will show more button-pressing and report more anxiety, responsibility and attempts 
to control their thoughts. Each dependent variable is discussed below and the results related to 
previous research. This is done with the following limitations: (1) comparisons are primarily made 
to studies using adult participants, (2) the dependent measures are different and (3) experimental 
paradigms are different. 
 4.2.2.1 Anxiety. 
 No difference was found between the groups on anxiety change and anxiety was 
significantly lower on the during-task and post-task measures compared to the pre-task measure. 
Therefore the hypothesis was not supported. 
 This is not consistent with results from previous experimental studies, which have found an 
increase in anxiety following an experimental manipulation of thought-action fusion (Rachman et 
al., 1996; Zucker, Craske, Barrios, & Holguin, 2002; van den Hout et al., 2001, 2002; Bocci & 
Gordon, 2007). Rassin et al. (1999) found that their experimental group experienced significantly 
more discomfort than the control group after a thought-action fusion manipulation. The 
experimental methods used in these studies were designed to be substantially more anxiety-
provoking. Studies using a sentence paradigm have asked participants to write and think about a car 
crash happening to a loved one and Rassin et al. (1999) told participants that their thoughts could 
cause someone to receive an electric shock. In comparison, the negative consequence suggested by 
the current study – that the experimenter's expensive computer could be damaged – is not as severe 
and unlikely to be as anxiety provoking. It is possible that children were more anxious at the start 
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because the exact details of the task were unknown and they may have been worried about their 
ability to succeed at the task. 
 4.2.2.2 Button-pressing. 
 Children were asked to press a button if they had a thought that they were concerned might 
damage the computer. This was used to elicit behavioural attempts to neutralise intrusive thoughts. 
Overall, low rates of button-pressing were found in this study: most children did not press the 
button at all. Therefore button-pressing was coded as a categorical variable; seven children pressed 
the button in the experimental group and 3 in the control group. This difference was not significant 
(p=0.083). 
 Rassin et al. (1999) found higher levels of button-pressing (mean = 5.2) and behavioural 
neutralisation has been noted in around half of participants following a sentence to induce thought-
action fusion (Bocci & Gordon, 2007; Rachman et al., 1996; van den Hout et al., 2001; Zucker et 
al., 2002). Unlike the current study, these studies suggested a particular intrusion (e.g. the word 
„apple'). Wegner (1994) has demonstrated that attempts at thought-control, once a particular word or 
thought has been suggested, can bring about a paradoxical increase in unwanted thoughts. These 
studies were also significantly more anxiety provoking than the current study.  
  Further analysis suggested that children who pressed the button did so because of intrusive 
thoughts that they were concerned about. This result of the is consistent with that of Bocci and 
Gordon (2007) who found a significant association between behavioural neutralisation and „urge to 
cancel thoughts‟ following a thought-action fusion manipulation, suggesting that the adults who 
used behavioural neutralisation strategies were doing so because of intrusive thoughts.  
 4.2.2.3 Responsibility. 
 Responsibility was assessed using one measure of probability of harm and one measure of 
responsibility and severity of harm.  
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 4.2.2.3.1 Probability of harm. 
 This study found low levels of probability of harm following the task, the between groups 
difference was not significant; therefore the hypothesis was not supported.  
 A small number of studies have measured likelihood of harm beliefs following a thought-
action fusion manipulation using a sentence induction paradigm. Results have ranged from 2.6 out 
of 100 to 24.14 out of 100 (Bocci and Gordon, 2007; Rassin, 2001; Zucker et al., 2002) The lowest 
score of 2.6 (Rassin, 2001) was found after a 5 minute delay before completion of measures and 
seems to be consistent with the scores found in this study.  
 4.2.2.3.2 Responsibility and severity of harm. 
 The „responsibility‟ item measuring responsibility and severity of harm had a mean score of 
approximately 8 out of 12 for the whole sample and both groups indicating that children „mostly 
agreed‟ with statements about severity and responsibility. There was no difference in responsibility 
between the control and experimental groups, so the hypothesis was not supported.  
 Other experimental studies of thought-action fusion in adults have also found moderate 
levels of responsibility for harm, ranging from 41 to 63.61 using a 0–100 visual-analogue scale 
(Bocci & Gordon, 2007; Rassin, 2001; Rassin et al., 1999; Zucker et al., 2002). No other studies 
compared this measure between groups in a way comparable with the current study. 
 4.2.2.4 Thought-control. 
 In this study the mean score for thought-control was 3.51 in the experimental group and 2.91 
in the control group. The difference was significant with a t-test at p=0.012, representing a medium 
effect size of 0.55. The means in both groups suggest that most children used thought-control 
strategies to some extent. In this study, thought-control probably involved thought suppression. 
Wegner (1992, 1994) proposed that suppression involves the deliberate search for thoughts 
unrelated to the target thought. In keeping with this theory, one child in this study commented: „I 
thought of chocolate, then I thought of my maths homework. I don't think I could have damaged the 
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computer‟. A number of other children made spontaneous statements about what they had chosen to 
think about (e.g. football) suggesting conscious strategies.  
 Rassin et al. (1999) measured „efforts to avoid thinking‟ of the word „apple‟ on a visual 
analogue scale ranging from 0–100, after telling participants in their experimental group that 
thinking this word would result in another participant receiving an electric shock. The experimental 
group scored significantly higher (59.2) than the control group (20.2). The results of the current 
study were in the same direction as that found by Rassin et al. 
 Other experimental studies, using a sentence to induce thought-action fusion, have measured 
types of thought-control on a visual analogue scale ranging from 0–100. Results have ranged from 
27.7 to 80 (Bocci & Gordon, 2007; Rachman et al., 1996; Rassin, 2001; Zucker et al., 2002). These 
studies use a variety of different terms for thought-control, which may not be equivalent. However, 
the finding of relatively high levels of suppression or urge to cancel out bad effects seems consistent 
with the high levels of thought-control found in this study.  
 4.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Association between induced thought-action fusion and the 
dependent variables. 
 This hypothesis stated that induced thought-action fusion will be positively correlated with 
the dependent variables, i.e. with OCD-like behaviours and cognitions. There was a significant 
correlation between induced thought-action fusion and thought-control in the experimental group 
and in the whole group. No other significant correlations were found. In observational studies, 
correlation cannot suggest causality but the experimental design of this study, where thought-action 
fusion was induced first and an opportunity for thought-control followed, means that it is possible 
to conclude that thought-action fusion caused significant levels of thought-control in the 
experimental, but not the control group. This partially supports the hypothesis. 
  Experimental studies designed to induce thought-action fusion in adults have found 
relatively high levels of thought-control (discussed in section 4.2.2.4 above). The result in this study 
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is consistent with this. Some studies have also found that inducing thought-action fusion has led to 
increased anxiety, responsibility, probability of harm and behavioural neutralisation including 
button-pressing (section 4.2.2 above). These results do not seem consistent with this study. 
However, methodological differences make it hard to compare this finding to previous research. 
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4: Association between likelihood thought-action fusion and the 
dependent variables. 
 This hypothesis stated that children's baseline level of likelihood thought-action fusion 
beliefs will contribute significantly to the variance of the outcome measures, including induced 
thought-action fusion. There was no relationship between baseline likelihood thought-action fusion 
and any of the outcome measures. Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.  
 A number of experimental studies with adults have also found no correlation between 
likelihood thought-action fusion and dependent variables similar to the ones used in this study 
(Bocci and Gordon, 2007; Rassin et al., 1999; van den Hout et al., 2001). In contrast, van den Hout 
et al. (2002) found likelihood thought-action fusion was significantly correlated with an increase in 
anxiety and with spontaneous neutralisation after a delay. Rachman et al. (1996) found it was 
significantly correlated with probability of harm, anxiety and responsibility. However, this study 
used participants high in thought-action fusion. These significant results are not consistent with 
those found in the present study, although it is interesting that the strongest correlation Rachman 
(1996) found was between likelihood-other thought-action fusion and probability of harm and the 
current study found a correlation approaching significance between these variables in the control 
group.  
  4.2.5 Hypothesis 5: Moderation by responsibility beliefs. 
 The hypothesis stated that the relationship between experimentally-induced thought-action 
fusion and button-pressing, anxiety and thought-control, will be moderated by responsibility beliefs. 
Moderation was tested, following the procedure suggested by Frazier et al. (2004). No moderating 
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relationship was found, therefore the hypothesis was not supported.   
 4.2.6 Hypothesis 6: Mediation by perceived responsibility. 
 The hypothesis stated that the relationship between experimentally-induced thought-action 
fusion and the dependent variables will be mediated by perception of responsibility. Perceived 
responsibility did not mediate the relationship between induced thought-action fusion and thought-
control or anxiety change therefore the hypothesis was not supported. 
 No other experimental studies have tested for this kind of mediating relationship. However, 
in this study, the experimental manipulation had no effect on responsibility. A number of other 
studies have found that, in adults, an experimental manipulation of thought-action fusion did 
increase responsibility (see section 4.2.3.2.2).  
 
4.3 Overview of Additional Results 
 In addition to the main results described above, details of demographic and exploratory 
analyses are discussed below. 
 4.3.1 Correlations among the independent variables. 
 Correlations on the pre-task visual analogue anxiety measure, MASC-10, RAS, TAFQA and 
the morality and likelihood subscales of the TAFQA were calculated. These are discussed below. 
 4.3.1.1 Visual analogue scale (VAS) of anxiety. 
The VAS scale was significantly correlated with the MASC-10, indicating that higher scores on the 
MASC-10 were associated with greater anxiety. This is consistent with previous literature which 
has found that visual analogue scales correlate with other mood measures (Lindsay & Powell, 
1994). It also indicates that the VAS in this study was a valid measure of anxiety.  
 4.3.1.2 Correlations between MASC-10, RAS and TAFQA. 
 Scores on the RAS were reversed, so that a low score indicated high responsibility. The RAS 
had a significant negative correlation with scores on the MASC-10, TAFQA scale and both 
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subscales. Scores on the MASC-10 were correlated with the overall and subscale scores on the 
TAFQA. 
 These results are consistent with Matthews et al. (2007) who found large negative 
correlations between RAS, thought action fusion total and subscales in a non-clinical sample of 13–
16 year-olds. They are also consistent with Muris et al. (2001) who found significant correlations 
between anxiety and thought-action fusion total and both subscales in a non-clinical sample of 13-
16 year-olds. Studies with adults have also found correlations between anxiety and likelihood 
thought-action fusion and smaller correlations between anxiety and moral thought-action fusion 
(Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Shafran & Rachman, 2004).  
 These results indicate that responsibility, thought-action fusion and anxiety are all correlated 
in this sample of non-clinical children, which is consistent with previous research. 
 4.3.2 Demographic differences. 
 Analyses showed that the total TAFQA scores and scores on both subscales for the current 
sample were significantly higher than those found by Muris et al. (2001) with a sample of 427 13–
16 year-olds. Matthews et al. (2007) found scores very similar to those found by Muris et al. in 
another sample of 13–16 year-olds. 
 This is consistent with other research on thought-action fusion and magical thinking which 
suggests that it decreases with age. An unpublished study by Laing et al. (2007) found thought-
action fusion was highest in children aged 7–10, before declining in early adolescence and Mathews 
et al. (2007) found that thought action fusion was negatively correlated with age in a sample of 13–
16 year olds.  
 
4.4 Methodological Critique 
 This section evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the research presented and their 
implications for the interpretations of results. 
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4.4.1 Design. 
 This study used a between-subjects experimental design to investigate whether thought-
action fusion beliefs led to obsessive-compulsive behaviours, cognitions and emotions. The use of 
an experimental design has a number of advantages. Firstly, the manipulation of a variable and the 
inclusion of a control group allows causality to be implied. In this case, the experimental design 
allowed some conclusions to be drawn about the way in which thought-action fusion affected 
obsessive-compulsive behaviours like thought-control in children. This attempted to overcome the 
problem that most previous research on thought-action fusion has used observational designs, which 
cannot adequately show causality. With children, there has only been one previous experimental 
study of thought-action fusion (Rassin et al., 1999) and this included older adolescents and a 
number of adults, limiting its relevance for understanding thought-action fusion in children.  
Thought-action fusion is, by definition, a belief which does not have a rational explanation. 
The helmet used in this experiment provided a rational real-world explanation for how thoughts 
could have a real effect. However, there are a number of reasons why this was necessary: 1) 
Children of this age range are less likely to endorse magical explanations than younger children 
(Subbotsky, 2005) and simply telling the children that their thoughts could turn the pictures red, 
without providing the helmet, may well have failed to generate high enough levels of belief to 
investigate the effects of thought-action fusion. 2) Using the helmet minimised the risk that children 
would develop generalised thought-action fusion beliefs about the power of their thoughts. 3) 
Theories of the effect of thought-action fusion on OC behaviours and emotions do not depend on 
the way the thought-action fusion beliefs develop, rather it is the belief itself that is important. 
Therefore, the cause of the belief should not change its effects. For these reasons, the helmet was 
considered to a necessary and appropriate part of the experiment.  
4.4.2 Advantages of the experimental manipulation. 
 This study developed and used a novel method of manipulating thought-action fusion in 
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children in an experimental task. Two previous experimental methods have been used with adults: a 
sentence designed to induce thought-action fusion concerns (e.g. Rachman et al., 1996) and an 
experiment where participants in the experimental group were given a helmet and told that a 
computer could read their thoughts and thinking „apple‟ could cause someone else to be given an 
electric shock (Rassin et al., 1999). There are a number of difficulties with both these methods: (1) 
participants do not see evidence that their thoughts could really cause harm; (2) participants' belief 
in the thought-action fusion manipulation is not measured; (3) they are too anxiety provoking to be 
used ethically with young children and (4) a particular „damaging‟ thought is suggested, which may 
introduce a confounding factor of a suppression effect as a specific thought is made salient and then 
becomes difficult not to think about (e.g. Wegner, 1994). The novel method used in this study was 
developed in order to overcome these difficulties. 
 The current study asked children to wear a special helmet and „think red‟, showing children 
in the experimental group pictures which turned redder. This was intended to be a more ecologically 
valid demonstration of thought-action fusion in children because participants could see the effects 
of their thoughts on a real world object. It is suggested that thought-action fusion beliefs may 
develop when children assume causality after particular thoughts are paired with events (Tallis, 
1994). This method means that it is possible to establish how easily children make the assumption 
that their thoughts can cause events and whether this belief might lead to concerns about harm. It 
was also possible to measure children's task-induced thought-action fusion beliefs in both the 
experimental and control group, to confirm that it really was these beliefs that were affecting 
dependent variables. 
  A further advantage to this method is that a particular „damaging thought‟ was not suggested 
to participants. Participants were given a non-specific suggestion about „high energy‟ thoughts. The 
current study sought to find out whether participants would become worried about particular 
thoughts, if they believed their thoughts could affect the computer. Another advantage was that the 
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experimental design allowed thought-action fusion to be manipulated in children in an ethical way. 
By restricting the thought-action fusion to the computer and carefully debriefing children 
afterwards, children could develop strong beliefs in the power of their thoughts without risk of 
harm.  
 4.4.3 Disadvantages of the experimental manipulation. 
 The experimental manipulation was novel and carrying it out revealed a number of 
significant disadvantages. The thought-action fusion induction gave children evidence about the 
power of their thoughts to influence the computer (positive thought-action fusion) but it did not give 
them direct evidence that their thoughts could damage the computer. The suggestion of damage was 
made and it was hoped that children who thought they could influence the computer would be more 
concerned about damaging it. This design was used because of ethical concerns that evidence of 
damage could cause high levels of anxiety. It was hoped that children's belief in the suggestion that 
they could damage the computer would be tested by the „probability of harm‟ question, but 
problems with this question, not apparent during piloting, make the interpretation of the results 
uncertain (see section 4.4.4). 
 An unforeseen consequence of inducing thought-action fusion before suggesting the 
possibility of damage is that the experimental manipulation may have had a positive mood-
induction effect in children who believed they had influenced the computer. From observation it 
appeared that children in the experimental group received inadvertently a positive mood-induction 
in comparison to children in the control group, who were disappointed and therefore had a relatively 
negative mood-induction. This mood effect may have counterbalanced the anxiety-provoking 
effects of the suggestion of damage. The impact of mood on thought-action fusion has been 
identified by Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam and Kalsy (2003) who found that the relationship 
between likelihood thought-action fusion and OCD symptoms was mediated by negative affect. 
This was an observational study, so mediation must be interpreted with caution, but it suggests that 
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an unforeseen mood-induction effect may have affected the relationship between induced thought-
action fusion and the OCD related dependent variables. In the current study, there were no 
significant between groups differences in self-reported anxiety but there was no measure of positive 
affect. 
 A further drawback was that the negative consequence suggested to children did not increase 
anxiety. Children's anxiety was low at baseline and reduced over time. Other studies on thought-
action fusion have used more anxiety-provoking potential consequences, such as another participant 
receiving an electric shock (Rassin et al., 1999). In the current study children were told that they 
might damage an expensive computer. This less serious outcome was suggested for ethical reasons. 
However, cognitive theories of OCD suggest that the desire for anxiety relief strongly motivates the 
performance of mental strategies and physical compulsions and that anxiety contributes to intrusive 
thoughts (e.g. Rachman, 2003; Salkovskis, 1985). Consistent with this, Gaskell, Wells and Calam 
(2001) found a large and significant correlation between anxiety and number of intrusions during a 
thought suppression task in a sample of 7–11 year-olds. It is possible that children may not have 
been anxious enough to provide a realistic demonstration of the effects of thought-action fusion.  
 4.4.4 Timing of measures. 
 Further difficulties were caused by the timing of the measures. The measures of thought-
action fusion, responsibility and thought-control were given after the children had been reassured 
that the computer was not damaged. This was done for ethical reasons, to minimise anxiety. 
However, it is possible that the reassurance would have discharged feelings of responsibility in 
particular and the retrospective question required children to reflect on previous feelings they may 
not have been very aware of. This effect would not apply to the question about thought-action 
fusion because children would continue to believe (or not believe) that they had influenced the 
computer until they were debriefed. It is also likely that answers to the thought-control question 
were not affected by the timing of the question, as thought-control would have been a conscious 
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strategy and so easier for children to reflect on than feelings of responsibility. 
 The timing of the measures was problematic for other reasons. Children completed the 
second anxiety measure immediately after the first part of the task, but before the suggestion that 
they could damage the computer was made. This was because it was anticipated that the children's 
anxiety might decrease from Time 1 to Time 2, as they became familiar with the equipment and 
knew more about the task. Time 2 was effectively intended to be a „baseline‟ measure. The final 
measure of anxiety was taken 1 minute after the suggestion that they might damage the computer 
was made. During this time the „risk‟ of damage to the computer remained present. However, 
opportunities for thought-control and neutralisation were there and it is possible that anxiety 
decreased during the minute. This is discussed further in section 4.5.1.3. 
 4.4.5 Blinding. 
 The researcher was blind to the condition the children were in because children were 
allocated according to a computer program immediately before they took part. The blinding is an 
advantage, because knowing which experimental condition a participant is in can introduce 
systematic bias in support of the study's hypothesis (Tilly, 1996).  
 There was one threat to the blinding. At times, children who thought they were making the 
pictures turn red got very excited and told the researcher. This suggested to the researcher that a 
child was probably in the experimental group. However, it became apparent early on that some 
children in the control group responded in the same way. The majority of children did not tell the 
researcher how the experiment had gone and the researcher made every effort to quickly move on to 
the next part without engaging in conversation about the first part of the task.  
 4.4.6 Sample and recruitment. 
 During the recruitment process, steps were taken to achieve a diverse sample of participants. 
The sample included children from small rural schools as well as a large city school. The ethnicity 
of the sample was predominantly white British. The groups were balanced on gender, although there 
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were somewhat more females overall. Exclusion criteria were kept to a minimum.  
 The sample size did not reach that required by power calculation. Three results approached 
significance: (1) a correlation between likelihood thought-action fusion and probability of harm in 
the control group (2) a between groups difference in button-pressing and (3) a correlation between 
induced thought-action fusion and probability of harm in the control group. The smaller than 
planned sample size reduced power to detect significant differences and relationships. However, the 
nature of the study may have made recruitment more difficult. Three schools reported that they did 
not want to take part because the study involved deception.  
 4.4.7 Independent Measures. 
 A strength of this study was the use of a reliable questionnaire to assess children's baseline 
anxiety symptoms. The brief nature of the MASC-10 reduced time taken by children to complete 
measures and allowed the researcher to score it before children completed the task. This meant that 
children above the clinical cut-off could be given a different version of the task.  
 The TAFQA was designed for use with adolescents and has good psychometric properties 
with this group (Muris et al., 2001). Use of this measure means that it was possible to compare 
levels of thought-action fusion in this younger age group to those found in adolescents (Muris et al., 
2001). However, a disadvantage of using the TAFQA is that scores cannot be compared to scores on 
the Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (Shafran et al., 1996) which is the most common 
measure of thought-action fusion with adult participants. This means that participant's level of 
thought-action fusion cannot be compared to those found in clinical or non-clinical adult samples. 
 The RAS has acceptable reliability in a similar-aged sample (Reeves et al., 2010). However, 
as reported in that study, some of the words are difficult for younger children and the present study 
made two changes to make the scale easier to understand. Nonetheless, some children were unsure 
about the meaning of certain questions, introducing the potential for misunderstanding and 
inaccurate responding. However, the researcher was able to support children and minimise this risk. 
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 Visual analogue scales were used to assess state anxiety over short time periods. The single 
item has shown sensitivity to changes in anxiety over short time periods in children (Bernstein et 
al., 1994) and is quick to complete. However, very few studies have used these measures in children 
and as there was only one item, it was not possible to calculate reliability for this measure. The item 
at Time 1 did correlate significantly with the MASC-10, suggesting it was a valid measure of 
anxiety. 
 4.4.8 Dependent measures. 
 A number of Likert scale measures were developed for this study, some based on those used 
by Reeves et al. (2010), to assess induced thought-action fusion, perception of responsibility, 
control of thoughts and reason for button-pressing. These were short and children appeared to 
understand the questions. The 3-item measures for thought-action fusion and responsibility and 
severity of harm had good internal consistency. 
 The inclusion of a measure of task-induced thought-action fusion was an advantage of the 
current study. This made it possible to (1) check the manipulation was successful, (2) confirm that 
thought-action fusion was causing any between groups differences and (3) establish whether 
independent variables contributed to the variance in belief strength. It also allowed analyses using 
correlations, which maximise power because they maintain the continuous nature of the variable.  
 However, there were some disadvantages to the post-task measures. It was not possible to 
establish the internal consistency of the single-item measures for probability of harm and thought-
control, although both items have face validity. A further disadvantage was the ambiguity of the 
question about probability of harm. This was in the form of a statement: „some of my thoughts 
could have damaged the computer‟. During testing, some children thought this was referring to 
damage which had just occurred to the computer, which they had just been reassured was not 
damaged. This interpretation would lead to low scores. It was also possible to interpret the 
statement as being about the possibility that their thoughts could, in theory, damage the computer. 
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This was the interpretation intended. Responses may also have been influenced by a „social 
desirability effect‟ as children wanted to show the researcher that they had not damaged the 
computer. A number of children, while completing this question, stated out loud that they had not 
thought anything that could have harmed the computer. These difficulties mean the results for this 
question must be interpreted with caution. 
 A further difficulty with these measures is that it is hard to compare them to the 0–100 visual 
analogue scales used in experimental manipulations of thought-action fusion with adults. However, 
this disadvantage was considered to be outweighed by the suitability, demonstrated by previous 
studies, of this kind of measure for children. 
 
4.5 Theoretical Interpretations of Research Findings 
 This section presents the implications of the research in terms of theory and clinical practice. 
 4.5.1 Implications for the role of thought-action fusion in OCD in childhood. 
 This study developed and used a new research paradigm and there were a number of 
methodological difficulties which make it difficult to interpret findings, particularly the non-
significant findings.  
 4.5.1.2 Thought-action fusion and thought-control. 
 The experimental group showed significantly higher levels of thought-control with a t-test. 
There was also a significant correlation between thought-action fusion and thought-control in the 
whole group and the experimental group. Taken together, these results suggest that thought-action 
fusion beliefs caused thought-control. It is likely that the main form of thought-control would have 
been thought suppression, where children chose to think about particular things in order to avoid 
thoughts they were worried could be harmful and this was supported by children's spontaneous 
comments.  
 These results suggest that the role of thought-action fusion in OCD may apply to children. 
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Cognitive models of OCD suggest thought-control is an important maintenance factor in OCD for 
three reasons: (1) thought-control ends exposure to the thoughts, preventing dis-confirmation of 
beliefs about their significance and danger (Newth & Rachman, 2001; Rachman, 1997, Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980); (2) it causes hypervigilance to thoughts and increases the salience of unwanted 
thoughts (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1998); (3) it may cause a paradoxical increase in intrusive 
thoughts (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Wegner, 1994). Purdon and Clark (2000) have proposed 
that thought suppression is also problematic because it supports unhelpful meta-cognitive beliefs 
about the importance of thought-control, which are also associated with OCD (OCCWG, 1997).  
 Research has supported the role of thought suppression in OCD. Adults with OCD use 
thought suppression more than non-anxious controls (Amir, Cashman & Foa, 1997) and it is 
associated with OCD symptoms in non-clinical samples (Purdon, 1999; Rassin et al., 2000; Smári 
& Hólmsteinsson, 2001). Barrett and Farrell (2006) found a large and significant correlation 
between thought suppression and OCD symptoms in a clinical sample of children, adolescents and 
adults. In adolescents, thought suppression has been shown to have a large and significant 
correlation with worry (Gosselin et al., 2007). However, Gaskell, Wells and Calam (2001) found 
that thought-suppression did not result in increased intrusions in 7–11 year-olds and Barrett and 
Farrell found that children with OCD had significantly less thought suppression than adults. These 
results suggest that thought suppression is related to OCD in children, but may not be as important a 
factor as it is in adults. 
 The current study found that perceived responsibility did not mediate the relationship 
between induced thought-action fusion and thought-control and neither was this relationship 
affected by prior responsibility beliefs. These null results are consistent with Rachman's (2003) 
personal significance model of OCD and the metacognitive model of OCD (Wells & Matthews, 
1994), which suggest that thought-action fusion can contribute directly to OCD symptoms. 
However, methodological problems with the timing and ambiguity of key measures, along with low 
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levels of anxiety, mean that these null results cannot be interpreted. The opportunity for thought 
suppression before the final measures may also have decreased children's responsibility beliefs; this 
is discussed further in section 4.5.1.3. 
 4.5.1.3 Thought-action fusion and other OCD behaviours, cognitions and emotions. 
 Button-pressing, anxiety and beliefs about responsibility and probability of harm did not 
differ between groups and did not show a relationship with thought-action fusion. The 
methodological difficulties make these null results hard to interpret and there are a number of 
possible explanations. 
 It is possible that the significant association between thought-action fusion and thought-
control may, in part, account for the absence of other significant results. Suppression or delay for 2 
– 5 minutes following a thought-action fusion manipulation significantly reduces responsibility, 
anxiety and probability of harm estimates (Rachman et al., 1996; Rassin, 2001; van den Hout et al., 
2001, 2002). Suppression may have a particularly strong effect on estimates of probability of harm. 
Rassin (2001) found that participants instructed to suppress thoughts had significantly lower 
estimates of probability of harm than did non-suppression participants after the same delay. In the 
current study, the risk of harm remained present during the last part of the task, which lasted one 
minute. For this reason, it was thought that having measures immediately afterwards would be 
appropriate. However, the salience of the risk may have declined over time and because of the 
suppression, so that no between groups differences were detected. Suppression may also have 
contributed to the low levels of button-pressing. Analyses showed that children who pressed the 
button were more likely to have done so in response to intrusive thoughts than „to be on the safe 
side‟. A meta-analysis of studies of thought suppression (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001) found 
that in the short term, suppression does reduce intrusive thoughts. Gaskell et al. (2001) found that 
children instructed to suppress reported fewer intrusions that a non-suppression group. In this study 
suppression may have resulted in fewer intrusions and hence lower levels of button-pressing.  
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 A further possible explanation for the lack of significant results is that children from a non-
clinical population are quite robust to the effects of thought-action fusion. Children of this age have 
stronger thought-action fusion beliefs and may be used to coping with these concerns. Thought-
action fusion appears to cause thought suppression and suppression may have fewer negative 
consequences in younger children (see section 4.5.1.2). It is also the case that other OCD-related 
beliefs, such as responsibility, which may interact with thought-action fusion, seem to be at a lower 
level in children of this age (Reeves et al., 2010). However, developmentally, there may be a critical 
period beyond which point magical thinking or thought-action fusion becomes more unusual and 
also more associated with anxiety and associated disorders. If responsibility beliefs do mediate the 
relationship between thought-action fusion and OCD symptoms, developmental increases in these – 
and other OCD-related beliefs or strategies – may make thought-action fusion beliefs become more 
problematic.  
 A further likely contributor to the lack of significant results, and the low levels of button-
pressing, are methodological difficulties, most of which worked against type 1 error. These include: 
(1) possible positive mood-induction effect of the task in the experimental group; (2) low anxiety 
levels; (3) timing of the measures; (4) ambiguity of the probability of harm measure and (5) reduced 
power.  
 4.5.2 Clinical implications. 
 The findings provide preliminary support for a link between thought-action fusion and 
thought-control in children. A causal relationship between thought-action fusion and other OCD 
behaviours and anxiety was not demonstrated but because this was a novel experimental task it is 
difficult to interpret the null result. Nonetheless, thought-control and excessive concern about the 
importance of controlling one's thoughts are both associated with OCD (OCCWG, 1997). If 
thought-action fusion beliefs cause children to use unhelpful thought-control strategies and support 
beliefs about the importance of thought-control, then it would make sense to measure children's 
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thought-action fusion beliefs during OCD assessment. Particular attention could also be paid to how 
these might relate to beliefs about thought-control and thought-control strategies. Both these 
assessments could contribute to the development of a more thorough individual formulation. 
 An appropriate assessment tool might be the TAFQA, which was found to have a high 
internal consistency in the current study and significant correlations with anxiety and responsibility. 
Children in this study did not have difficulty understanding or completing this measure. However, 
in the current study, it had no significant relationship with the dependent variables, whereas a Likert 
scale measure of induced thought-action fusion, which was specifically related to the task, did. This 
suggests that, as well as measuring general thought-action fusion beliefs, it might be appropriate to 
develop individualised Likert scale measures of thought-action fusion based on a child's OCD-
related thoughts, such as the measures used by Barrett and Healy (2003).  
 If children were found to have high levels of thought-action fusion, the results of this study 
supports the use of strategies to reduce thought-action fusion. In the adult literature, normalising 
information about intrusive thoughts, together with an educational message describing and 
challenging thought-action fusion beliefs, led to fewer OCD-related symptoms following a thought-
action fusion manipulation compared to a control group (Zucker et al. 2002). If psycho-educational 
approaches were used with children, these could be adapted to be developmentally appropriate. 
Ronen (1997) suggests the use of concrete language, common metaphors and practical examples. 
Friedberg and McClure (2002) illustrate the use of cartoons, comic strips and games to support 
cognitive therapy techniques. 
 Rachman (2003) has advocated the use of behavioural experiments challenging thought-
action fusion beliefs with adults. These can include behavioural experiments about positive thought-
action fusion, for example asking participants to estimate how likely they would be to win the 
lottery if they thought hard about it for a week and then test this out. More anxiety-provoking 
experiments can also be used, for example predicting and then testing what will happen in terms of 
85 
 
anxiety and outcome if the client thinks of an accident happening to the therapist, or a loved one. A 
hierarchy of increasingly anxiety- provoking thoughts could be developed and gradually tested out. 
March and Mulle (1998) emphasise the important of client control when developing a hierarchy, so 
that exposure does not feel like punishment. They suggest that a hierarchy can be developed by 
looking initially at situations where the child is able to resist OCD.  
 March and Mulle (1998) suggest the use of pie charts to evaluate risk factors which would 
contribute to a feared outcome. Children are encouraged to think of all the things that could 
potentially contribute to a feared event and give each a slice of a responsibility „pie‟. This technique 
can help children to consider factors other than themselves or their thoughts which could cause a 
feared outcome.  
 If thought-action fusion is particularly likely to cause thought-control, this suggests that, in 
children with high levels of thought-action fusion, strategies designed to minimise thought-control 
might be especially important. Cognitive therapy with adults often includes a demonstration of the 
paradoxical effects of thought suppression, where the therapist can ask the patient „not to think of a 
white bear‟ (Abramowitz, Franklin, & Cahill, 2003). This helps clients to realise that if they try not 
to experience a thought, they may experience it more. Mindfulness-based approaches to obsessional 
thought in OCD encourage the non-judgemental acceptance of obsessional thoughts and have been 
used in adults to reduce thought suppression (Hannan & Tolin, 2005). There is preliminary evidence 
that mindfulness techniques can be successfully adapted for use with children with anxiety (Semple, 
Lee & Miller, 2004; Semple, Reid & Miller, 2005).  
 Although individualised CBT strategies to target thought-action fusion and thought-control 
may be important and helpful, it is widely recognised that a family intervention component is an 
important part of therapy with children. March and Mulle (1998) emphasise the importance of 
family sessions and the gradual withdrawal of families from rituals. Barrett et al. (2004) developed 
a family-based CBT treatment based on March and Mulle, which involves parents in psycho-
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education, problem-solving skills and the development of strategies to reduce parental involvement 
in symptoms and encourage family support for home-based ERP. More research looking at how 
families could be involved in helping children use cognitive techniques would be important. 
 
4.6 Implications for Future Research 
 There is a great deal of scope for research into thought-action fusion in OCD in children. 
Current research is relatively sparse (see Table 1). There has only been one experimental study of 
thought-action fusion with children and this has used older adolescents and adults (Rassin et al., 
1999). This section considers the implications for future research, including ways to improve the 
current study and suggestions for other areas of investigation. 
 A key improvement to the current study would be a manipulation of thought-action fusion 
which provided „evidence‟ to an experimental group that their thoughts could cause damage. This 
would more accurately represent the development of thought-action fusion beliefs in OCD (Shafran 
& Rachman, 1996; Tallis, 1994) as well as providing a more anxiety-provoking manipulation. 
During the initial part of the task as children in the experimental group see the pictures turn red, the 
computer could appear to „crash‟. The researcher could look concerned and inform children that he 
or she has been told the computer can be damaged by „high energy thoughts‟. The computer could 
be „re-started‟ and the final part of the task carried out as usual. Participants in the experimental 
group would have been exposed to direct evidence that the computer can be affected in a negative 
way by their thoughts. This more powerful manipulation is likely to be more anxiety provoking and 
avoid the positive mood-induction effect that may have been present in the current study. As a result 
it would probably be a more powerful test of the effects of thought-action fusion. 
 A further alteration could be to the timing of the measures. In the current study, anxiety was 
measured before the second part of the task was explained to children. It would be possible to also 
measure anxiety after the explanation. In the current study, the final measures took place after 
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children were reassured there was no damage to the computer. It would be possible for the computer 
to appear to „re-start‟ after the final part of the task. The researcher could make it clear that the 
computer needed to re-start before he or she could tell that no damage had been done. Children 
could complete measures during the „re-start‟ and be reassured that the computer was undamaged 
immediately afterwards. These changes are designed to be more anxiety provoking, but the anxiety 
would be of very short duration – approximately 2 minutes. Piloting could be used to make sure that 
anxiety levels were not too high. The low anxiety levels in the current study suggest that this 
manipulation would not be too anxiety provoking. 
 The current study would also benefit from some changes to the measures. The ambiguous 
measure of probability of harm could be altered. Two measures of thought-control and probability 
of harm would also allow checks of internal consistency to be performed. Further measures, or 
questions, to establish more clearly the nature of the thought-control used by children could provide 
a more detailed understanding of the relationship between thought-action fusion and thought-
control.  
 Future studies testing the relationship between thought-action fusion and responsibility 
would be useful. Reeves et al. (2001) successfully manipulated responsibility in children of this age 
group by giving different instructions before a sorting task. A similar manipulation could be used to 
build on the current study. Based on this, the experimental group could be split into a „low 
responsibility‟ group and a „no responsibility manipulation‟ group. The „low responsibility‟ group 
could be told that if any damage did occur, it would be entirely the responsibility of the researcher 
and not the child. With careful piloting, a „high responsibility‟ condition, along with the thought-
action fusion manipulation, might also be possible. 
 Given the high levels of thought-control found in this study and the relationship between 
thought-action fusion and thought-control, further studies investigating cognitive processes of 
thought suppression in children would be important. Gaskell et al. (2001) found that children did 
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not experience increased intrusions after suppression and Farrell and Barrett (2006) found that 
children with OCD displayed significantly less thought suppression than adults. A greater 
understanding of the effects of cognitive development on thought suppression and how this might 
relate to other beliefs like thought-action fusion would help to develop a cognitive conceptualisation 
of OCD in childhood.  
 
4.7 Final Summary and Conclusions 
 Childhood OCD is more prevalent than has previously been thought (Heyman et al., 2001); it 
has a severe impact on social and academic functioning and typically continues into adulthood 
(Pauls et al., 1995; Piacentini et al., 2003). The role of cognitive factors in OCD in adults is well 
established and evidence suggests that many of these factors may also be relevant for children with 
OCD. Thought-action fusion is one of the beliefs associated with OCD in adults and children 
(Barrett & Healy, 2003, Libby et al., 2004). It may be of particular interest in understanding 
childhood OCD because beliefs about the power of thoughts and wishes are a part of normal 
development (Subbotsky, 2005). Current research suggests that, while responsibility beliefs may 
have less of a role in OCD in childhood than adulthood, thought-action fusion beliefs are 
comparable across the age range (Farrell & Barrett, 2006). 
 Different cognitive models of OCD suggest different roles for thought-action fusion beliefs. 
Rachman's (2003) personal significance model and Wells and Matthew's (1994) meta-cognitive 
model both suggest that thought-action fusion beliefs can directly contribute to the development and 
maintenance of OCD symptoms. In contrast, Salkovskis's inflated responsibility model (1985) 
suggests that thought-action fusion beliefs contribute to inflated responsibility which then causes 
OCD symptoms. There has been little experimental research investigating the causal relationship 
between thought-action fusion, inflated responsibility and obsessive-compulsive symptoms in 
children. 
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 The current study investigated whether thought action fusion was causally related to 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms by experimentally manipulating thought-action fusion and 
examining the effects on a number of dependent variables. The manipulation was found to be 
successful, showing that thought-action fusion can be experimentally manipulated in children of 
this age range. A large and significant correlation was found between thought-action fusion and 
thought-control in the experimental group. The experimental group also showed significantly higher 
levels of thought-control with a t-test, but this has to be interpreted with caution because data was 
not normally distributed. Perceived responsibility did not differ between groups and did not mediate 
the relationship between thought-action fusion and thought-control. These findings suggest that 
thought-action fusion can cause thought-control and hence offer preliminary support for a causal 
role for thought-action fusion in OCD in children. However, a number of methodological 
limitations mean that the study can give little additional information about the relationship between 
thought-action fusion and responsibility beliefs and how this relates to obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. 
 More broadly, this study provides support for the growing body of research which suggests 
that cognitive models developed to understand OCD in adults may also be important for childhood 
OCD. Thought-action fusion beliefs appear to be affected by cognitive development. This study 
found higher levels of thought-action fusion than have been found in a sample of 13–16 year-olds 
(Muris et al., 2001). Further research may help to identify differences in the way that cognitive 
models may apply to children compared to adults. A number of possibilities for further research 
have been suggested, in particular, experimental studies improving on the current study, as well as 
research looking at the role of thought suppression in OCD in children. The use of clinical as well 
as non-clinical samples would be particularly helpful. 
 The results suggest that cognitive assessment of thought-action fusion beliefs in children with 
OCD, as well as their relationship to thought-control strategies may be helpful. Techniques to 
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address these beliefs in adults might also be helpful in children. It is too early to draw firm 
conclusions about the role of thought-action fusion in OCD in children, but the current study has 
provided a potentially useful method of research, as well as some preliminary evidence which 
suggests further research would be helpful.  
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Appendix A 
Power Calculation 
 
The sample size was determined using an estimated effect size of 0.50, with power – the probability 
of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis – at 80%. This gave a sample size of 100. The workings 
are shown below. 
 
For power = 0.8, δ = 2.50 for a one-tailed test: 
n = 2 (δ/d)² 
  = 2(2.5/0.5)² 
  = 50 
Therefore 50 participants are needed per group, giving a total of 100. 
 
 
 
109 
 
Appendix B 
Information about Participating Schools from Ofsted Website 
 
Primary School A (report dated 01/02/2008) 
 School A is a large primary school in an urban area of a city. At the date of the last Ofsted 
report, there were 343 pupils aged 3-11 at the school, including nursery classes. The proportion of 
pupils entitled to free school meals, the proportion of pupils identified as having learning 
difficulties and/or disabilities, the number of pupils from minority ethnic groups and those who 
speak English as an additional language are all above the national average.  
 
 Primary School B (report dated 08/06/2007) 
 School B is a village primary school, close to a large city. It is slightly smaller than average, 
with   217 pupils aged 4-11. Most pupils are from a White British background and no pupils speak 
English as an additional language. The proportion of pupils with learning difficulties and those 
eligible for free school meals is below average. 
 
Primary School C (report dated 23/07/2010) 
 School C is a small village primary school close to a large city. It has 93 pupils aged 4-11. 
Most pupils are of White British heritage, few are eligible for free school meals and the proportion 
of pupils with special educational needs is average.  
 
Primary School D (report dated 25/09/2007) 
 Primary School D is a small primary school in a medium-sized town. It has 108 pupils aged 
4-11. Almost all pupils come from White British families and very few are eligible for free school 
meals. The proportion with learning difficulties and/or disabilities is above the national average. 
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Appendix C 
Letter to Head Teachers 
 
 
Date:  
 
 
LETTER TO HEAD TEACHERS 
 
 
 
 
Dear Head Teacher: 
 
My name is Alison Sillence; I‟m a trainee clinical psychologist in my third year of the Doctoral Programme in 
Clinical Psychology at the University of East Anglia. I am carrying out a research project with children as part of 
my training. The aim of the research is to examine children's „magical thinking‟.  
 
Magical thinking refers to beliefs that defy scientific laws of causality, for example telepathy, or beliefs in the 
power of wishing. Many children go through a phase of magical thinking and then grow out of it. However, for 
some children, magical thinking becomes more of a problem and is associated with psychological difficulties like 
anxiety. Therefore, it is important that we find out more about it in normal children. Attached is an information 
sheet with more details about the study.  
 
I am aiming to recruit 80 children aged 9-11 to take part in the research and am contacting head teachers in 
Cambridgeshire schools to see if they would like their school to take part. If you are interested I would like to 
come and meet you at your school to answer any questions you might have. If you agree to take part, the school 
would receive a £2 book voucher for each child who participates. 
 
Participation in the study is completely voluntary. If you agree to your school's taking part , I would send parents 
full information about the study and ask for their consent to involve their child. I would also ask children for their 
assent. The study has been approved  by the Faculty of Health Research Ethics Committee at UEA   I have an 
enhanced CRB check and am experienced in working with children and their families. 
 
I hope you are interested in taking part. I will contact your secretary next week to follow up this letter. If you 
would like to contact me my e-mail address is a.sillence@uea.ac.uk. Alternatively, you can contact me or my 
supervisor Professor Shirley Reynolds at the School of Medicine, UEA, on the telephone number above. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter. I look forward to speaking to  you. 
 
Your sincerely, 
 
Alison Sillence 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
       University of East Anglia 
Department of Clinical Psychology 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
Telephone 
 01603 456161 
Fax 
01603 458553 
Email 
a.sillence@uea.ac.uk 
 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
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Appendix D 
Information for Head Teachers 
 
How Magical Thinking Develops in Children 
 
 Information Sheet for Head Teachers 
 
 
What is this research about? 
The aim of the research is to examine children's „magical thinking‟. Many children go through a 
phase of magical thinking and then grow out of it. However, for some children, magical thinking 
becomes more of a problem and is associated with psychological difficulties like anxiety; therefore 
it is important that we find out more about it in normally developing children.  
 
We want to examine how asking children to „think magically‟ about a computer task affects their 
thoughts, feelings and behaviours. We hope that the research will contribute towards our 
understanding of psychological difficulties in children and help us develop effective treatment.  
We want to test our ideas with children aged between 9 and 11 years old, who have not been 
identified as having psychological difficulties.  
 
What will children be doing? 
If parents decide they would like their child to take part, I will meet each child at school and tell 
them about the study. If they want to take part, this is what would happen: 
 
1. I would ask them to complete some short questionnaires about their current mood, their feelings 
and their magical thinking beliefs. This should take about 25 minutes and they can take a break 
when they want to.  
 
2. Next, I would ask them to put on a helmet. I would show them some pictures on a computer 
screen and tell them that if they think hard enough, the helmet may be able to pick up their thoughts 
and change the pictures on the computer. In fact, the helmet cannot really pick up their thoughts, but 
it is important that they think it might be able to, so that they try hard to influence the computer.  
 
Half the children would see the pictures changing on the computer and half would see the pictures 
stay the same. This means that half of the children would be encouraged to think that their thoughts 
can influence the computer. Children would allocated at random to one of these two groups. 
 
3. Next, I would ask the child to keep the helmet on for another minute while I finished off another 
task. While they were waiting I would ask them to press a button on the keyboard if at any time 
they thought their thoughts might interfere with the experiment or damage the computer. 
 
4. I would then ask them to take the helmet off and tell them that the computer is absolutely fine. 
 
5. Finally, I would ask them about their thoughts and feelings about the task. This would take about 
5 minutes. 
 
6. At the end of the school day, I would explain to all the children who took part in the study that 
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they did not really influence the computer. I would tell them what the study was about and 
encourage them to ask questions and discuss it with each other and with me. To thank them for 
taking part, I would give them a reward, which would be a small toy.  
 
 
How much will parents and children be told about the study? 
Parents will be given full information about the study, explaining its purpose and what their child 
will be asked to do. They will be asked not to pass this information about the study to their child. 
Often, if parents tell their children, children can tell their friends and this could affect the outcome 
of the study. 
Children will not be given all the information parents have about the study until after they have 
taken part. This is because the experiment would not work if children knew they could not really 
influence the computer.  
 
Are there any risks to the children? 
We are not aware of any risks arising from the task itself. However, some children might feel 
slightly disappointed when I tell them that they did not really influence the computer. To minimise 
this risk, I will explain that the helmet is very convincing and adults have also believed they can 
change the pictures. I will also explain that the experiment will help us to understand more about 
why some children feel anxious and how we can help them. They will then be given a small toy, to 
thank them for taking part. 
 
Any child who is confused or upset will be spoken to individually and their teacher informed. 
During the experiment, if a child did become upset, the task would be stopped immediately. The 
child would be comforted and the reason for their distress would be discussed and their teacher 
would be notified. 
 
If a child‟s answers about their mood suggest that they might be experiencing psychological 
difficulties I would contact their parents and recommend that they contact their GP. 
 
 
What are the potential benefits? 
For schools, this is an opportunity to engage with the UEA and for children to take part in research. 
We hope that the results of the research will contribute to improving our understanding of 
psychological difficulties in children. 
 
For every child that participates in the study, a £2 book voucher will be given to the school. I would 
be happy to visit the staff or parents at the school to talk about children's psychological problems 
and/or the results of our study. 
 
Can parents and children change their minds? 
Parents and children are free to withdraw from the research at any time, without giving a reason.  
 
Who will have access to the results?  
Data management will follow the Data Protection Act. Written records will be kept in a locked 
cupboard at the University of East Anglia. All children and parents will be identified by unique 
identity numbers. I will not keep any information that could identify individual parents or children 
to someone else. The research data will be password protected and available only to myself and my 
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UEA supervisor Professor Shirley Reynolds. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The University of East Anglia Faculty of Health Research Ethics Committee has reviewed and 
approved this research project. 
 
Who do I speak to if problems arise?  
If there is a problem please let Alison Sillence (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) or Professor Shirley 
Reynolds (Chartered Clinical Psychologist) know. You can contact them at the following address: 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
University of East Anglia 
NORWICH 
NR4 7TJ 
Tel 01603 593310 
 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
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Appendix E 
Information for Parents/Guardians 
Parent/Guardian Information Sheet  
 
Hello, my name is Alison Sillence. I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist studying at the University 
of East Anglia. I am CRB checked and have experience working with children. I would like to 
invite your child to take part in a research project. Please could you take time to read the following 
information to help you decide whether you would like your child to take part. If there is anything 
that is not clear, or if you would like more information please contact me on the number below, I'm 
very happy to talk to you. Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is this project about? 
Many children believe that their thoughts and wishes can have an effect in the real world, this is 
called „magical thinking‟. Children usually go through a phase of magical thinking and then grow 
out of it. However, for some children, magical thinking carries on for longer and is associated with 
anxiety. Anxiety is  one of the most common psychological problems experienced by children and it 
can be very disabling. We hope that if we can understand more about how magical thinking works 
in normally developing children, this will contribute to our understanding of anxiety problems in 
children and help us develop effective treatments. 
 
We want to test our ideas with children aged between 9 and 11 years old, who have not been 
identified as having psychological difficulties. 
 
Your child has been asked to take part because your child's Primary School is helping with the 
research. 
 
I’m interested, what should I do? 
If you want to hear more about the project, please read on. Please don‟t pass the information about 
the study on to your child, even if you decide you do not want them to take part. This is because the 
project can only work if the children who take part do not know what we are looking for. At the end 
of the day, all every child who takes part will be told about the study. 
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What will my child be doing? 
If you decide you would like your child to take part, I will meet them at school and tell them about 
the study. If they want to take part, this is what will happen: 
1. I will arrange to see your child at school along with some of their classmates. 
 
2. I will ask them to complete some simple questionnaires about their current mood, their 
feelings and their magical thinking beliefs. This should take about 25 minutes and they can 
take a break when they want to. I will go through these questions step by step so children 
understand what is asked of them and have support with their reading. 
 
3. Next, I will ask your child to put on a helmet. I will show them some pictures on a computer 
screen. I will tell them that if they think hard enough, the helmet may be able to pick up 
their thoughts and change the pictures on the computer. In fact, the helmet cannot really pick 
up their thoughts, but it is important that they think it might be able to, so that they try hard 
to influence the computer.  
 
Half the children will see the pictures changing on the computer and half will see the pictures stay 
the same. This means that half of the children will be encouraged to think that their thoughts can 
influence the computer. Each child will be randomly allocated to see the pictures change or to see 
them stay the same. This random allocation will happen on the day and I will not be able to 
influence it. After 2 minutes that part of the task is finished. 
 
4. Next, I will ask your child to keep the helmet on for another minute while I finish off 
another task. While they are waiting I will ask them to press a button on the keyboard if at 
any time they think their thoughts might interfere with the experiment or damage the 
computer. 
 
5. I will then ask them to take the helmet off and tell them that the computer is absolutely fine. 
 
6. Finally, I will ask your child about their thoughts and feelings about the task using another 
simple questionnaire. This will take about 5 minutes 
 
7. At the end of the school day, I will explain to all the children who took part in the study that 
they did not really influence the computer. I will tell them what the study was about and 
encourage them to ask questions and discuss it with each other and with me. To thank your 
child for taking part, we will give them a reward, which will be a small toy.  
 
 
Are there any risks to my child? 
Children who have done this task have enjoyed it and it is very unlikely that the task would  upset 
your child . However, if your child did become upset, I would stop the task immediately. I would 
comfort them, talk about what upset them and if they remained upset I would let their teacher know. 
 
Some children might feel slightly disappointed when I tell them that they did not really influence 
the computer. To minimise this risk, I will explain that the helmet is very convincing and adults 
have also believed they can change the pictures. I will also explain that the experiment will help us 
to understand more about why some children feel anxious and how we can help them. They will 
then be given a small toy, to thank them for taking part. 
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If your child‟s answers about their mood suggest that they might be experiencing psychological 
difficulties I would contact you and recommend that you contact your GP. 
 
What are the potential benefits? 
This is an opportunity to get involved in research that could contribute to improving our 
understanding of psychological difficulties in children. 
 
For every child that participates in the study, a £2 book voucher will be given to the school. 
 
Will it affect my child’s care or education? 
No, your child‟s care or education will not be affected in any way. This research is being carried out 
with the permission and co-operation of your child‟s school. 
 
Can I change my mind? 
Yes. It is up to you and your child to decide whether or not to take part. You are both free to 
withdraw from the research at any time, without giving a reason. Your decisions about this will not 
affect your child's education in any way.. 
 
Who will have access to the results?  
Data management will follow the Data Protection Act. Written records will be kept in a locked 
cupboard at the University of East Anglia. All children and parents will be identified by unique 
identity numbers. I will not keep any information about your or your child that could identify you to 
someone else. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The University of East Anglia Faculty of Health Research Ethics Committee has reviewed and 
approved this research project. 
 
Who do I speak to if I have a question or if problems arise?  
If there is a problem please let Alison Sillence (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) or Professor Shirley 
Reynolds (Professor of Clinical Psychology) know. You can contact them at the following address: 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
University of East Anglia 
NORWICH 
NR4 7TJ 
Tel 01603 593310 
OK, I want to take part – what do I do next? 
If you and your child would like to take part, please fill in the information sheet about your child 
and the consent form that are both enclosed and return them to the school office in the envelope 
provided. Your child can only take part if you return these forms to the school office by Friday 2
nd
 
July. 
 
Even if you do not want to take part in the study please do not pass this information about the study 
to your child. Often, if parents tell their children, children can tell their friends and this will effect 
the outcome of the study. 
 
Please contact me if you have any questions. I hope you are happy for your child to take part,  
thank you. 
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Appendix F 
Demographic Questionnaire 
Participant Identification Number: 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
Title of Project:  How Magical Thinking Develops in Children 
 
Name of Researcher: Alison Sillence, Trainee Clinical Psychologist. 
 
Please complete the following information about your child by circling the appropriate 
response. Please return this questionnaire in the envelope provided with the consent form if 
you are willing for your child to participate in the research. 
 
 
1. Is your child a girl or boy      Boy / Girl 
 
2. How old is your child       ____ years 
 
3. How would you describe your child‟s ethnic group? (you can leave this blank if you do not want 
to give the information) 
 
4. Is your child colour blind?       Yes / No 
(We ask this as the task involves looking at coloured pictures) 
 
5. Does your child have epilepsy?                 Yes / No 
(We ask because this task involves images changing on a computer screen) 
 
Please return this with the consent form in the envelope provided to the school office. 
 
 
Thank you for your help. 
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Appendix G 
Parent/Guardian Consent Form 
Participant Identification Number: 
 
PARENT/GUARDIAN CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: How Magical Thinking Develops in Children 
 
Name of Researcher: Alison Sillence, Trainee Clinical Psychologist. 
 
Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet  
for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the  
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
 
2. I understand that my child's participation is voluntary and that I am free to  
withdraw my child at any time without giving any reason and without my child's 
medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
 
3. I understand that my child will not be given complete information about the study 
until after they have taken part. 
 
 
4. I agree that my child may take part in the above study. 
 
 
Please complete the following: 
 
 
_____________________  _______________  _____________________ 
Name of Child    Child's Date of Birth  Name of School and class 
 
______________________  _____________  _____________________ 
Name of Parent / Guardian   Date    Signature 
 
Thank you for your help. 
 
Please return this consent form to the school office in the envelope provided.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Office use only 
 
____________________  ______________  _____________________ 
Name of Researcher    Date     Signature 
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Appendix H 
Information for Children 
 
I n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  c h i l d r e n  
 
My name is Alison. I am doing a research project and I would like to invite you to take 
part. You can choose if you want to take part. Before you choose I would like you to 
read this information. You can ask me as many questions as you like . 
 
What is research? Why is this project being done? 
Research tries to find out the answers to questions. In this project, I will be asking 
children to put on a special helmet and try to change some pictures on a computer. I 
want to see how you go about doing this and how you feel about the task. 
 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
This project is interested in children aged between 9 and 11 years old, which is why 
you have been asked to take part. 
 
What would I have to do? 
If you and your parents/guardians choose that you would like to take part, this is 
what will happen: 
 I will come and see you at school 
 I will ask you some questions about your feelings 
 You will complete a task on the computer. This is not difficult and should be 
fun. 
 I will ask you some more questions about your feelings after the task 
 All these parts together should take less than an hour. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You do not have to take part in this project and you can change your mind at 
any time, without giving a reason. 
 
Who will know what I said?  
Only people involved in the project will know what you say. If you tell me something 
that is worrying you then I might share it with your parents or guardians. 
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Appendix I 
Tinting of Images Shown to Experimental Group 
1) baseline mean tint: 10% 
2) Baseline tint SD: 17% 
3) Max tint mean: 100% 
4) Max tint SD: 20% 
5) tinting increased after 3 images 
6) tinting reaches its maximum after 45 images 
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Appendix J 
Images Shown to Experimental Group  
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Appendix K 
Images shown to control group 
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Appendix L 
Ethics Approval Letters 
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Appendix M 
Procedure for Children Scoring Above Cut-Off on the MASC-10: 
The same procedure was followed, with the following exceptions, so that the experiment did not 
induce anxiety: 
 Children were told that it is very unlikely they would be able to influence the computer 
because the design is in the very early stages. 
 They were put in the control group, and shown unaltered images.. 
 When they had finished this part, they did not complete the final part and were not told that 
their thoughts could damage the computer. 
 They were thanked and asked to complete the measures as usual, where relevant. 
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Appendix N 
Letter for Parents of Anxious Child 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 
  
 
Dear Mr/Mrs, 
 
 
Thank you once again for agreeing to take part in my study. As you know, when I met with 
(name of child), s/he completed some questionnaires. One of these asked about his/her fears and 
worries. (name of child) reported that s/he was worried about more things than most children of 
his/her age. Sometimes the questions are not very accurate for a particular child or the fears they 
report are short-lived. However if you are concerned about (name of child), you might find it 
useful to talk to your GP or his/her teacher. 
 
Thank you again for your help and please get in touch with me if you have any questions about 
this letter or the study. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Alison Sillence         
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
   
 
Supervised by: 
Prof Shirley Reynolds   Prof Malcolm Adams 
Professor of Clinical Psychology  Professor of Clinical Psychology  
 
 
 
University of East Anglia 
 
Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
 
Telephone 
01603 593310 
 
Fax 
01603 591132 
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Appendix O 
Responsibility Attitude Scale  
Participant identification number: 
This questionnaire lists beliefs which people sometimes have. Read each statement carefully and decide 
how much you agree or disagree with it. 
 
For each of the beliefs, put a circle round the words which BEST DESCRIBE HOW YOU THINK. Choose 
only one answer for each attitude. Because people are different, there are no right or wrong answers. 
 
To decide whether a given attitude is like your way of looking at things, simply keep in mind what you 
are like MOST OF THE TIME. 
 
1. I often feel responsible for things that go wrong. 
 
 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
2. If I think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
3. I worry a lot about what might happen because of things that I do or don‟t do.  
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
4. Not stopping bad things happening is as bad as making them happen. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
5. I should always try to stop harm happening, when I have thought it might. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
6. I must always think through what might happen as a result of even the smallest things I do.  
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
7. I often take responsibility for things which other people don‟t think are my fault. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
8. Everything I do can cause serious problems. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
9. There are often times when I nearly cause harm  
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
10. I must protect others from harm. 
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TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
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11.  I should never cause even the smallest amount of harm to others. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
12. People will think very badly of me because of my actions. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
13. I must try to stop bad things from happening, if there is any chance that what I do might make a 
difference. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
14. Doing nothing when bad things might happen is the same as making it happen. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
15. You should never be careless, when what you do might affect someone else. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
16. If I do nothing that can cause as much harm as doing something bad. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
17. I can‟t forgive myself, once I think it is possible that I have caused harm. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
18. Lots of things I have done, have been meant to prevent harm to others. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
19. If I am careful enough then I can prevent any harmful accidents. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
20. I often think that bad things will happen if I am not careful enough. 
  
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
AGREE VERY 
MUCH 
 
AGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
 
DISAGREE 
VERY MUCH 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
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Appendix P 
 Thought Action Fusion Questionnaire  
 
Each question describes a situation and has a sentence that you might or might not agree with. Read 
each sentence carefully and DECIDE HOW MUCH YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE with it. 
 
Put a circle round the words which BEST DESCRIBE HOW YOU THINK. Choose only one answer for each 
attitude. Because people are different, there are no right or wrong answers. 
 
 
1. You are with a friend. Suddenly without any reason you think that your friend is a stupid 
person 
 
Having this thought is almost as bad as really saying to your friend that he is stupid. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
2. Suddenly without any reason you have the thought that you are dying. 
 
Having this thought increases the chance that you really are going to die. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
3. You are alone in a church standing in front of a large statue of Jesus. Suddenly you have the 
thought of spitting on the statue. 
 
Having this thought is almost as bad as spitting on the statue. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
4. Suddenly without any reason you have the thought that your father loses his job and that 
there are money problems at home. 
 
Having this thought increases the chance that your father really will lose his job. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
5. You meet a classmate. Suddenly without any reason you think of a nasty name for this 
person. 
 
Having this thought is almost as bad as calling this person a nasty name. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
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6. Suddenly without any reason you have the thought that you are hit by a car. 
 
Having this thought increases the chance that you really will be hit by a car. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
7. You are sitting in the classroom. All your classmates are quietly working. Suddenly you 
have the thought of shouting at the top of your voice. 
 
Having this thought is almost as bad as really shouting at the top of your voice in the silent class. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
8. Suddenly without any reason you have the thought that you will fall seriously ill. 
 
Having this thought increases the chance that you really will fall seriously ill. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
9. In a silent street, you meet a younger child. Suddenly without any reason you think of 
pushing the child down. 
 
Having this thought is almost as bad as really pushing the child down. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
10. Suddenly without any reason you have the thought of your father being in a car accident. 
 
Having this thought increases the chance that your father really will have a car accident. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
11. You walk on the street and meet an unfamiliar person. Suddenly you have the thought of 
making a rude gesture to this person. 
 
Having this thought is almost as bad as really making the rude gesture to this person. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
12. Suddenly without any reason you have the thought that your mother is dying. 
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Having this thought increases the chance that your mother really is going to die sometime soon. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
13. You have heard that the parents of one of your classmates are getting a divorce. Suddenly 
you have the thought of teasing the classmate with this information. 
 
Having this thought is almost as bad as really teasing your classmate with this information. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
14. Suddenly without any reason you have the thought that you have to repeat a year at school. 
 
Having this thought increases the chance that you really will repeat a year. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
 
 
15. You come across the purse of your mother. Suddenly you have the thought of stealing some 
money from the purse. 
 
Having this thought is almost as bad as really stealing money from the purse. 
 
not at all true  somewhat true  rather true  very true 
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Appendix Q 
 
Visual-Analogue Anxiety Measure 
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Appendix R 
Induced Thought-Action Fusion and Responsibility Measure 
What did you think? 
I am interested in how you feel and what you think about the task you just finished. Please read the 
following statements carefully and circle the number that shows how much you agree or disagree 
with the statements.  
 
 Completely 
disagree 
Mostly 
disagree 
Not sure if I 
agree or 
disagree 
Mostly 
agree 
Completely 
agree 
1. I was able to 
make the pictures 
redder 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
2. I found it easy 
to make the 
pictures redder 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
3. I am confident I 
influenced the 
computer with my 
thoughts 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
4. Some of my 
thoughts could 
have damaged the 
computer 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
5. If the computer 
had been 
damaged it would 
have been really 
bad 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6. If the computer 
had been 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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damaged it would 
have been my 
fault 
7. If the computer 
had been 
damaged it would 
have been 
because of my 
thoughts 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
8. I tried to 
control my 
thoughts to avoid 
damaging the 
computer 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
9. I pressed the 
button only when 
I had a thought 
that could damage 
the computer 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
10. I pressed the 
button just to be 
on the safe side 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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Appendix S 
Task Instructions 
1.  Tell the child: 
“I'd like you to help with an experiment that I'm doing. I'm asking children to put on a special 
helmet, think hard about the colour red and try to change some pictures on the computer screen. I 
want to find out how well the helmet works and what you think about the task”. 
“Before you do the task, I'll be asking you some questions about your thoughts and feelings. It‟s not 
like a test, because there are no right or wrong answers; I just want to know what you think. I won't 
be telling your teachers or your mum or dad about your answers, they are just for my project.” 
 
2. Give the child the information sheet to read or read this out loud to them. 
 
3. Ask the child: 
“Are there any questions you'd like to ask me?”  
 
4. If they are happy to participate give them the assent form to complete and give each child 
their participant number.  
 
5. Tell the child: 
“Before you do the experiment with the helmet, I‟d like you to answer some questions about your 
thoughts and feelings. We can go through these together.” 
Give each child the MASC-10, RAS and TAFQA.  
 
6.  If in a group, decide which child will do the experiment first and ask the other children to 
return to their class. 
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7. Ask the child to put the helmet on and sit in front of the computer. Put in child's age, gender 
and participant number. Click „next‟. 
 
8. Tell the child: 
“First of all, the computer is asking you how you are feeling. Some children feel a bit nervous and 
anxious; if that's how you feel you can use the mouse to drag the bar this way [point to screen]. 
Some children feel quite calm and steady and if that's you, you can drag the bar this way [point to 
screen]” Click Next. 
 
9. Tell the child: 
“You are going to see a series of pictures come up on the screen one after another. Think hard about 
the colour red; try to visualise it in your mind. The computer will try to pick up on what you're 
thinking and begin to turn the pictures red. It won't work straight away, because the computer needs 
time to tune in and it doesn't always work so don't be disappointed. Just try your hardest. If you 
want to stop, for any reason, that's fine - just call my name or hold up this „STOP‟ card. When the 
computer's finished, let me know. When you're ready to begin click „next‟.” 
 
10.  Child lets researcher know they have finished. 
 
11. Tell the child: 
“Now the computer is asking you about how you are feeling again. If you feel a bit jittery or 
nervous, you can drag the bar this way, and if you feel quite calm and steady, you can drag it this 
way [point to screen].” 
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12.  Tell the child: 
“Now the computer needs to take some background readings. You don't have to think about anything 
in particular, but if the computer is sensitive to your thoughts, it can be damaged by surges of 
energy and the equipment is very expensive. When I click „next‟ you will see a big button that says 
„disconnect‟. If you have a thought you're worried might damage the computer, please press the 
disconnect button. You can press it every time you have a thought you are worried might damage 
the computer. This part takes about a minute, so let me know when it‟s finished, or if you want to 
stop let me know or hold up the „STOP‟ card.” 
 
13. Child lets researcher know they have finished. 
 
14. Tell the child: 
“Now the computer is asking you about how you are feeling one more time. If you feel a bit jittery 
or nervous, you can drag the bar this way, and if you feel quite calm and steady, you can drag it this 
way [point to screen].” 
 
15. Tell the child: 
“Now I have some questions to ask you, so I can find out what you thought about the experiment. 
There are no right or wrong answers, I just want to know what you thought.” 
 
Give the child the questionnaire including measures of: induced thought-action fusion, probability 
of harm, responsibility, severity of harm, thought-control and reasons for button-pressing. 
 
16.  Tell child: 
“Thank you for helping me, you've done a brilliant job! I'm going to ask [name next child] to have a 
turn now. When everyone who is helping me today has taken part, I'm going to call you back in your 
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group so you can choose your thank-you present and I can tell you a bit more about the 
experiment.” 
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Appendix T 
Debriefing for Children 
Children were debriefed in their groups, one group after another. This was so that the researcher 
could assess each child's reaction to the debrief and because it was expected that children will feel 
more confident to ask questions in a smaller group. 
 
1. Show children the bag of presents and ask each child to choose one item. 
 
2. Tell the child or children: 
 Because I was doing science, I told you something that was not quite true. I told you that if 
you thought red, you might be able to make the pictures on the computer more red. 
 In fact, the helmet I asked you to wear was just pretend. Electricity in our heads can't get 
into the wires in the computer, so our brainwaves cannot change the pictures on the screen.  
 For some of you, I changed the pictures on the computer so that they were more red, but this 
was not affected at all by your thoughts, the computer just showed you a different set of 
pictures. Some of you saw the pictures made more red, and some of you saw pictures that 
weren't changed. 
 There are very very expensive computers, costing hundreds of thousands of pounds, in a few 
laboratories in the world which can pick up electricity in our heads, but they are very special 
computers, built by scientists. None of the computers you can buy in the shops can do this 
and none of your computers at home will be able to. 
 Why did I do that? I did it because sometimes, people believe their thoughts can change 
things in the world and make things happen and this can make some people feel worried and 
upset. I wanted to understand a bit better what happens when people think their thoughts can 
change things. I hope that this knowledge will help us understand better how to help people 
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who feel upset and worried. 
 You have really helped me by doing the study today and I'm very grateful. 
 Do you want to ask any questions? 
 Sometimes people can feel a bit cross or disappointed when they find the helmet isn't real, 
does anyone feel that way? 
 
3.  If more children at this school are to be tested: 
 I'm coming back again tomorrow so that some more children can have a turn. For this to 
work, it‟s really important that they try hard to change the pictures and think that they might 
be able to. Do you think you can help me by keeping the secret until [name day] and not 
telling anyone else that the helmet is just pretend? 
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Appendix U 
Demographic Data and Comparisons on Independent Measures for Participants who Completed 
the Thought-Control Question 
 
Demographic Data for Participants who completed the thought-control measure 
The demographic characteristics of the sample and each of the experimental groups was explored. 
Table U1 shows the gender distribution of the whole sample and each of the experimental groups 
for those children who completed the thought-control question.  
Table U1 
Frequency of Males and Females for Participants Who Completed the Thought-Control Question 
 N Males  Females 
Whole sample 67 27 40 
Experimental group 35 14 21 
Control group 32 13 19 
 
The mean age of participants was 122 months (10 years 2 months; SD = 9.92 months) and the range 
was  9 years 0 months to 11 years 10 months (Table U2). The mean age in both groups was not 
significantly different. 
Table U2 
Mean Age in Groups for Participants who Completed the Thought-Control Question 
 N Mean age (months) SD 
Whole sample 67 122.1 10.02 
Experimental group 35 122.6 9.75 
Control group 32 121.6 10.45 
 
Comparisons between Experimental and Control Groups on Age, Gender and Independent 
Variable Measures for Participants who completed the Thought-Control Question 
 Participants were matched across the groups on age and gender, however, data from some 
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participants could not be included, so it was important to check that the matching had been 
successful and the groups did not differ on age or gender. Participants were not matched across the 
groups on anxiety, responsibility beliefs or prior thought-action fusion beliefs, so it was important to 
determine whether they differed significantly on any of these variables. If there were significant 
differences, these would have to be covaried out in further analyses, to ensure differences in the 
groups were due to experimental manipulation, rather than pre-existing differences. 
 Age, TAFQA , morality subscale of the TAFQA, likelihood subscale of the TAFQA, RAS  
and MASC-10 were compared using a MANOVA (Table U3). MANOVA was used to reduce Type 1 
error and to maximise power (Field, 2005). Cases were excluded listwise, and there was missing 
data for one participant. Therefore the total number in the analysis was 66. The variables met the 
assumptions of MANOVA as outlined by Field (2005). The data were randomly sample and 
normally distributed. Initial Levene's tests for homogeneity of variance were non-significant, 
indicating that the assumption of univariate normality was met. Box's test indicated that the 
covariance matrices were not significantly different in each group, F(21, 14586) = 1.025, p=0.43; 
therefore the assumption of homogeneity of covariance matrices was also met. 
  The MANOVA was not significant: F(6,59) = 0.036, p=1.000. Therefore the groups did not 
differ at baseline on the key variables.  
Table U3 
Descriptive Data, F Values and p Values for the Independent Variables for Participants who 
Completed Thought-Control Question 
 Experimental Group Control Group F* P 
  
Mean 
 
 
SD 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
  
Age 
(months) 
 
122.57 9.75 121.58 10.61 0.156 0.694 
MASC-10 
 
11.11 5.64 10.97 5.29 0.012 0.914 
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 Experimental Group Control Group F* P 
 Mean SD Mean SD   
RAS 
 
66.74 13.45 66.16 16.05 0.026 0.873 
TAFQA 
 
31.14 8.41 31.10 8.49 0.000 0.982 
TAFQA - 
likelihood¹ 
2.42 0.91 2.46 0.85 0.043 0.837 
TAFQA – 
moral 
18.49 5.35 18.32 5.46 0.015 0.903 
VAS 1     0.008 0.931 
Note. N = 66 
*df(1, 65). 
¹This variable has been transformed 
  
 Pre-task anxiety on the visual analogue scale was not normally distributed. A non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test showed no significant difference between the groups (U=556.5, p=0.96). 
 
